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Abstract:
This thesis proposes an Intrusion Detection System, NeuDetect, which applies Neural Network
technique to wireless network packets captured through hardware sensors for purposes of real
time detection of anomalous packets. To address the problem of high false alarm rate
confronted by the current wireless intrusion detection systems, this thesis presents a method of
applying the artificial neural networks technique to the wireless network intrusion detection
system.
The proposed system solution approach is to find normal and anomalous patterns on preprocessed wireless packet records by comparing them with training data using Backpropagation algorithm. An anomaly score is assigned to each packet by calculating the
difference between the output error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the
wireless packet is flagged as anomalous and is negative then the packet is flagged as normal. If
the anomaly score is zero or close to zero it will be flagged as an unknown attack and will be
sent back to training process for re-evaluation.
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1.

INTRODUCTION:

Computer security is starting to become one of the more active areas in Computer Science and
Engineering. Almost everyday some flaw is found in a protocol, a program, or a system. These
flaws sometimes lead to security breaches that affect many companies and nations worldwide.

Network security solutions are generally grouped into two main categories: prevention-based
techniques and detection-based techniques. Prevention-based techniques, such as encryption
and authentication, are often the first line of defense against an attacker to reduce intrusions but
cannot eliminate them (Onat and Miri 2005). For example, encryption and authentication
cannot defend against compromised sensor nodes, which carry the private keys. From the
experiences of security research, no matter how many intrusion prevention messages are
inserted in a network, there are always some weak links that one could exploit to break in.
Detection-based techniques aim at identifying and excluding the attacker after preventionbased techniques fail. The detection techniques are categorized into signature and anomaly
detection. Signature detection techniques match known attack profiles with the current events,
whereas anomaly detection detects significant deviations from the established system normally.
Intrusion detection presents a second wall of defense and it is a necessity in any high
survivability network (Zhang and Lee 2000).

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to security attacks. WSNs can be deployed
in hostile environments and sensor nodes may be compromised. WSNs are always unattended
but physically reachable from the outside world, so they are vulnerable to security attacks.
Intruders, impersonating legitimate nodes, may disrupt the network operation by injecting false
information or by not cooperating in tasks such as packet forwarding. Such malicious node
activity can severely affect the network operation. Therefore, WSNs must be secured to
prevent an intruder from obstructing the delivery of correct sensor data. In wireless networks,
prevention-based security techniques are less effective because of the shared broadcast medium
and resource-limited network elements (Onat and Miri 2005). In multihop wireless networks,
nodes forward packets for other nodes and this requires additional trust requirements which
increase the complexity of prevention-based security solutions. As a multihop wireless
1

network, securing the WSNs with conventional prevention techniques is difficult due to
scalability problems, computation, communication and the storage overhead associated with
these methods. To provide a secure wireless sensor network, we need to deploy intrusion
detection and response techniques.

Intrusion detection research has generally focused on wired networks (Khoshgoftaar et al.
2005). The increasing reliance upon wireless networks has put tremendous emphasis on
wireless network security. Current WSNs are based on the IEEE 802.11 standard which is
known to have security flaws (Barbara et al. 2001). Recent efforts on WSN security have
generally focused on improving the network architecture or protocols and on detecting a
specific attack (CISCO 2007).

Most IDSs are based on hand-crafted signatures that are developed by manual encoding of
expert knowledge (Ertoz et al. 2004). These systems match activity on the system being
monitored to known signatures of attacks. The major problem with this approach is that these
IDSs fail to generalize to detect new attacks or attacks without known signatures. Recently,
there has been an increased interest in data mining based approaches to building detection
models for IDSs. These models generalize from both known attacks and normal behavior in
order to detect unknown attacks. They can also be generated in a quicker and more automated
method than manually encoded models that require difficult analysis of audit data by domain
experts. Several effective data mining techniques for detecting intrusions have been developed
(CISCO 2007; Gantenbein et al. 2002; Julisch and Dacier 2002; Barbara et al. 2001), many of
which perform close to or better than systems engineered by domain experts. We know that
data mining is a collection of powerful data analysis techniques intended to assist in analyzing
extremely large datasets. Data mining is not a single approach but a set of techniques that can
often be used in combination with each others to extract the maximum insight from a dataset.
Properly applied, data mining can reveal hidden relationships and information buried within an
organization's data warehouse.

2

1.1. Thesis Contribution:
This thesis proposes a wireless intrusion detection system named NeuDetect, with the
following major intentions:
Real-Time Intrusion Detection: Many existing intrusion detection systems (Lee and Stolfo
2000; Ertoz et al. 2004) rely heavily on manual intervention by a security administrator to
effectively protect networks. In the proposed system we have used proprietary hardware
sensors, where streams of wireless packets (e.g., MAC frames) from Access Points (AP) are
instantly captured and processed by using neural network techniques.

Training Data: Our proposed system uses training data. In the Detection Module of our
system, we have used a classifier using Back-Propagation Neural Network Algorithm to train
the system with crafted attacks and then to classify the incoming data packets comparing with
the trained attack database.

Faster Processing: The inherent speed of neural networks is another benefit of this approach.
Because the protection of computing resources requires the timely identification of attacks, the
processing speed of the neural network, even in a high speed network, enables intrusion
responses to be conducted before irreparable damage occurs to the system. Snort-Wireless (Air
Snort 2007) has a low attack detection rate in high speed network (Ejelike 2008). Our system is
capable to detect wireless attacks in high speed networks with acceptable false alarm rate.

Dynamically Updating Intrusion Database: The proposed system has the dynamic ability to
enhance the intrusion database in continuing to reevaluate the unknown packets through the
training process. An anomaly score is assigned to each packet by calculating the difference
between the output error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the relevant
wireless packet will be flagged as anomaly and an attack number is assigned for future
comparison with incoming packets. If the anomaly score is zero or close to zero the packet will
be flagged as unknown packet and sent back to training process. Finally if the anomaly score is
negative then the packet is flagged as normal.
3

Accuracy: Our proposed system uses training data to recognize known suspicious events with
a high degree of accuracy. ADAM has low attack detection rate especially in Man-in-Middle
type of attacks, about 65%, and also produces a lot of false alerts (Liu et al. 2007). Our system
can detect the attacks with more than 94% detection rate.

Unknown Attacks: Our system can detect unknown attacks with acceptable false alarm rate
(11%). Then these unknown attacks are added to the training samples to identify accurately as
known attacks later.

Reduced False Alarm Rate: Our system reduces the false alarm rate in detecting unknown
intrusions by using Back-Propagation (which is discussed later) neural network classification
and self-organization techniques. We have investigated that Snort-Wireless (Air Snort 2007)
and Clustering Approach (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005) have high false positive detection rate
(Ezeife et al. 2008). Our system can detect attacks with about 2% false positive and 5.5% false
negative detection rate which are better than some other existing wireless IDS like SnortWireless (Air Snort 2007), ADAM (Barbara et al. 2001), Wifi-Miner (Ezeife et al. 2008),
WIDCA (Ezeife et al. 2008), etc.

1.2. Thesis Outline:
This report is organized as follows: the rest of the chapter 1 introduces wireless sensor network
architecture, standard wireless protocol IEEE 802.11 's authentication processes and
vulnerabilities, intrusion classifications in wireless sensor network, types of attack, data mining
techniques in network intrusion detection systems. Chapter 2 discusses related work in network
intrusion detection systems that uses data mining techniques like association rule, classification
rule and cluster analysis algorithms for both wired and wireless network intrusion detection
systems, their limitations and technologies. Chapter 3 explains our proposed system's
algorithm and technology. Chapter 4 describes the experimental results of our system. Finally
Chapter 5 consists of conclusions and future work.

4

1.3. Wireless Sensor Network
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of a large number of sensor nodes. WSNs support
many novel and existing applications such as environment monitoring, infrastructure
management, public safety, medical and health care, home and office security, transportation,
and military applications. The sensor nodes are deployed over an area and form a wireless
network. The position of sensor nodes need not be engineered or pre-determined. The sensor
nodes are autonomous devices with limited battery, computational power, and memory. A
large number of sensor nodes are densely deployed and they have a short communication
range. Hence, multihop communication in sensor networks is expected to consume less power
than the traditional single-hop communication. Furthermore, the transmission power levels can
be kept low, which is highly desired in covert operations. Multihop communication can also
effectively overcome some of the signal propagation effects experienced in long-distance
wireless communication (Akyildiz et al. 2002).
A unique feature of sensor networks is the cooperative effort of sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are
fitted with an on-board processor. Instead of sending raw data to the nodes responsible for the
fusion, sensor nodes use their processing abilities to carry out simple computations locally and
transmit only the required and partially-processed data.

Figure -1 shows the complexity of wireless sensor networks, which generally consist of a dataacquisition network and a data-distribution network, monitored and controlled by a
management center. The over abundance of available technologies makes even the selection of
components difficult, let alone the design of a consistent, reliable, robust overall system (Lewis
2004).

5

Figure 1: Wireless Sensor Networks

1.3.1.

WSN Operation Modes:

802.11 wireless networks operate in one of two modes - Ad-hoc and Infrastructure mode. The
IEEE standard defines the ad-hoc mode as Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS), and the
infrastructure mode as Basic Service Set (BSS). In the remainder of this section, we explain the
differences between the two modes and how they operate.

In ad hoc mode, each client communicates directly with the other clients within the network by
using 802.11 a/b/g or Bluetooth standards, see figure 2. Ad-hoc mode is designed such that
only the clients within transmission range (within the same cell) of each other can
communicate. If a client in an ad-hoc network wishes to communicate outside of the cell, a
member of the cell MUST operate as a gateway and perform routing.

6

Client C
Figure 2: Example ad-hoc network

In infrastructure mode, A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) can be easily built using only a few
simple devices which mainly include a radio transceiver, called Access Point (AP), which is
essentially a small transmitter and receiver with a wired connection into an Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line (ADSL) link or Ethernet LAN. It forms an association with a wireless device
and acts as an intermediate between the client and the wired connection, providing
authentication and seamless access. A Network Interface Card (NIC) with 802.11 capabilities
which talks to the radio transceiver and allows the data transfer to and from your computer.
Each client sends all of its communications to a central station, or access point (AP). The
access point acts as an Ethernet bridge and forwards the communications onto the appropriate
network- either the wired network, or the wireless network, see figure 3.
Access'Point

Client B
Figure 3: Example infrastructure network

Prior to communicating data, wireless clients and access points must establish a relationship, or
an association. Only after an association is established can the two wireless stations exchange
7

data. In infrastructure mode, the clients associate with an access point. The association process
evolves in the following three states:
•

Unauthenticated and unassociated,

•

Authenticated and unassociated, and

•

Authenticated and associated

To transition between the states, the communicating parties exchange messages called
management frames.

We will now walk through a wireless client finding and associating with an access point. All
access points transmit a beacon management frame at fixed interval. To associate with an
access point and join a BSS, a client listens for beacon messages to identify the access points
within range. The client then selects the BSS to join in a vendor independent manner. A client
may also send a probe request management frame to find an access point affiliated with a
desired SSID. After identifying an access point, the client and the access point perform a
mutual authentication by exchanging several management frames as part of the process. After
successful authentication, the client moves into the second state, authenticated and
unassociated. Moving from the second state to the third and final state, authenticated and
associated, involves the client sending an association request frame, and the access point
responding with an association response frame. After following the above process, the client
becomes a peer on the wireless network, and can transmit data frames on the network.

1.3.2 Characteristics and Requirements for WSN
Due to the characteristics and limitations of WSNs, the following are the requirements in
building applications on this type of network (Culler et al. 2004):

I.

Large number of sensors:

Cheap small-sized sensors are used for the summarized information in it.

8

II.

Low energy use:

In many applications, the sensor nodes will be deployed in a remote area in which case
servicing a node may not be possible. Thus, the lifetime of a node may be determined by the
battery life, thereby requiring minimal energy expenditure.

III.

Efficient use of the small memory:

When building sensor networks, issues such as routing-tables, data replication, security and
such should be considered to fit the small size of memory in the sensor nodes.

IV.

Data aggregation:

The huge number of sensing nodes may congest the network with information. To solve this
problem, some sensors such as the cluster heads can aggregate the data, do some computation
(e.g., average, summation, highest, etc.), and then broadcast the summarized new information.

V.

Network self-organization:

Given the large number of nodes and their potential placement in hostile locations, it is
essential that the network be able to self-organize itself. Moreover, nodes may fail (either from
lack of energy or from physical destruction), and new nodes may need to join the network.
Therefore, the network must be able to periodically reconfigure itself so that it can continue to
function. Individual nodes may become disconnected from the rest of the network, but a high
degree of connectivity overall must be maintained.

VI.

Collaborative signal processing:

Yet another factor that distinguishes these networks from Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
(MANETs) is that the end goal is the detection/estimation of some event(s) of interest, and not
just communication. To improve the detection performance, it is often quite useful to fuse data
from multiple sensors. This data fusion requires the transmission of data and control messages.
This need may put constraints on the network architecture.

9

VII.

Querying ability:

There are two types of addressing in sensor networks: data-centric, and address-centric. In
data-centric, a query will be sent to a specific region in the network. Whereas, in addressingcentric, the query will be sent to an individual node.

1.4.

WLAN Standard Protocol: IEEE 802.11

Since the ratification of the IEEE 802.1 lb standard in 1999, wireless LANs have become more
prevalent. Today, wireless LANs are widely deployed in places such as corporate office
conference rooms, industrial warehouses, Internet-ready classrooms, and even coffee houses.
These IEEE 802.11-based, commonly known by Wi-Fi, wireless LANs present new challenges
for network administrators and information security administrators alike. Unlike the relative
simplicity of wired Ethernet deployments, 802.11-based wireless LANs broadcast radiofrequency (RF) data for the client stations to hear. This presents new and complex security
issues that involve augmenting the 802.11 standard.
Security in the IEEE 802.11 specification—which applies to 802.11a, 802.11b, and 802.1 lg—
has come under intense scrutiny. The 801.22b standard is the first widely used standard and is
known as Wi-Fi. Later in 2003, 801.1 lg standard was developed to operate in the same 2.4
GHz band as in 801.1 lb but with a higher speed of 55 Mbps. Currently, both of them denote
Wi-Fi standards. Researchers have exposed several vulnerabilities in the authentication, dataprivacy, and message-integrity mechanisms defined in the specification. These are reviewed in
this part
•

The authentication and data-privacy functions described in Clause 8 of the IEEE 802.11
specification

•

The inherent security vulnerabilities and management issues of these functions

•

How security issues can be addressed effectively only by augmenting the
802.11 security standard

10

1.4.1.

802.11 Authentication Processes

Wireless LANs, because of their broadcast nature, require the addition of user authentication to
prevent unauthorized access to network resources and data privacy to protect the integrity and
privacy of transmitted data. The 802.11 specification stipulates two mechanisms for
authenticating wireless LAN clients: open authentication and shared key authentication. Two
other mechanisms—the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and authentication by client Media
Access Control (MAC) address—are also commonly used. This section explains each approach
and its weaknesses.
The use of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) keys can function as a type of access control
because a client that lacks the correct WEP key cannot send data to or receive data from an
access point. WEP, the encryption scheme adopted by the IEEE 802.11 committee, provides
encryption with 40 bits or 104 bits of key strength. We will discuss WEP and its weaknesses in
brief.

I.

Service Set Identifier (SSID)

The SSID is a construct that allows logical separation of wireless LANs. In general, a client
must be configured with the appropriate SSID to gain access to the wireless LAN. The SSID
does not provide any data-privacy functions, nor does it truly authenticate the client to the
access point.

II.

802.11 Authentication

Authentication in the 802.11 specification is based on authenticating a wireless station or
device instead of authenticating a user. The specification provides for two modes of
authentication (CISCO 2007):
•

Open authentication

•

Shared key authentication

Another authentication process is widely used, MAC Address Authentication, which is not
described in 802.11 specification.
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II. a.

Open Authentication

Open system authentication is the default authentication protocol for 802.11. As the name
implies, open system authentication authenticates anyone who requests authentication.
Essentially, it provides a NULL authentication process. The 802.11 open authentication
process consists of the following transactions (Figure 4):
1. Client broadcasts a probe request frame on every channel
2. Access points within range respond with a probe response frame
3. The client decides which access point (AP) is the best for access and sends an
authentication request
4. The access point will send an authentication reply
o

5. Upon successful authentication, the client will send an association request frame to
the access point
6. The access point will reply with an association response
7. The client is now able to pass traffic to the access point

1. Profos Request
2. Probe Response

Wired
Neteork

3. Autherrticatbn Request
•#~™™ 4. AuthentE^tton Responss
5. Association Request —
Clent

S. Asociatbn Response

jtecesB Point

Figure 4: 802.11 Open Authentication Process

II. b.

Shared Key Authentication

Shared key authentication is the second mode of authentication specified in the 802.11
standard. Shared key authentication uses a standard challenge and response along with a shared
secret key to provide authentication. If the authentication is successful, then the client
(initiator) and the responder switch roles and repeat the process to ensure mutual
authentication. Shared key authentication requires that the client configure a static WEP key.
Figure 5 describes the shared key authentication process.
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1. The client sends an authentication request to the access point requesting shared key
authentication
2. The access point responds with an authentication response containing challenge text
3. The client uses its locally configured WEP key to encrypt the challenge text and reply
with a subsequent authentication request
4. If the access point can decrypt the authentication request and retrieve the original
challenge text, then it responds with an authentication response that grants the client
access

wired
- 4 **utw«tote«P«S!^»we<§4»:i»«
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WEP Key 123458

Figure 5: Shared Key Authentication Process

The format of an authentication management frame is shown in figure 6. The format shown is
used for all authentication messages. The value of the status code field is set to zero when
successful, and to an error value if unsuccessful. The element identifier identifies that the
challenge text is included. The length field identifies the length of the challenge text and is
fixed at 128. The challenge text includes the random challenge string.
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Figure 6: Authentication Management Frame
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III.

MAC Address Authentication

MAC address authentication is not specified in the 802.11 standard, but many vendors support
it. MAC address authentication verifies the client's MAC address against a locally configured
list of allowed addresses or against an external authentication server (Figure 7). MAC
authentication is used to augment the open and shared key authentications provided by 802.11,
further reducing the likelihood of unauthorized devices accessing the network (CISCO 2007).
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Figure 7: MAC Address Authentication Process

1.4.2
I.

802.11 Authentication Vulnerabilities
Use of SSID

The SSID is advertised in plain-text in the access point beacon messages (Figure 8). Although
beacon messages are transparent to users, an eavesdropper can easily determine the SSID with
the use of an 802.11 wireless LAN packet analyzer, like Sniffer Pro. Some access-point
vendors offer the option to disable SSID broadcasts in the beacon messages. The SSID can still
be determined by sniffing the probe response frames from an access point (Figure 9).
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Figure 8: SSID in an Access Point Beacon Frame
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Figure 9: SSID in an Access Point Probe Response Frame

The SSID is not designed, nor intended for use, as a security mechanism. In addition, disabling
SSID broadcasts might have adverse effects on Wi-Fi interoperability for mixed-client
deployments.

II.

Open Authentication Vulnerabilities

Open authentication provides no way for the access point to determine whether a client is
valid. This is major security vulnerability if WEP encryption is not implemented in a wireless
LAN. It is not recommended to deploy wireless LANs without WEP encryption.

III.

Shared Key Authentication Vulnerabilities

Shared key authentication requires the client use a pre-shared WEP key to encrypt challenge
text sent from the access point. The access point authenticates the client by decrypting the
shared key response and validating that the challenge text is the same. The process of
exchanging the challenge text occurs over the wireless link and is vulnerable to a man-in-themiddle attack. An eavesdropper can capture both the plain-text challenge text and the ciphertext response. WEP encryption is done by performing an exclusive OR (XOR) function on the
plain-text with the key stream to produce the cipher-text. It is important to note that if the XOR
function is performed on the plain-text and cipher-text are XORed, the result is the key stream.
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Therefore, an eavesdropper can easily derive the key stream just by sniffing the shared key
authentication process with a protocol analyzer (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Vulnerability of Shared Key Authentication

IV.

MAC Address Authentication Vulnerabilities

MAC addresses are sent in the clear as required by the 802.11 specification. As a result, in
wireless LANs that use MAC authentication, a network attacker might be able to subvert the
MAC authentication process by "spoofing" a valid MAC address. MAC address spoofing is
possible in 802.11 network interface cards (NICs) that allow the universally administered
address (UAA) to be overwritten with a locally administered address (LAA). A network
attacker can use a protocol analyzer to determine a valid MAC address in the business support
system (BSS) and an LAA-compliant NIC with which to spoof the valid MAC address.
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1.5.

INTRUSION ANAL YSIS

Intrusion detection is the art of detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity in
order to respond to external attacks as well as internal misuse of computer system. It discovers
violations of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and resources. Intrusion
detection demands as much information as the computing resources can possibly collect and
store. It needs constant improvement of technologies and processes to match pace of Internet
innovation. Intrusion can provide digital forensic data to support post-compromise law
enforcement actions. It can identify host and network wrong-configuration, improve
management and customer understanding of the Internet's inherent hostility. Also, it is able to
learn how hosts and networks operate at the operating system and protocol levels.

In the wireless sensor network, the stream source would be a remote sensor that monitors the
airwaves and generates a stream of 802.11 frame data as input to the analysis mechanism.
Since wireless attacks occur before data is on the wired network, it is important for the source
of the event stream to have access to the airwaves before the Access Point (AP) receives the
data. The analysis mechanism can consist of one or more components based on any of several
intrusion detection models. False positives, where the IDS generates an alarm when the threat
did not actually exist, severely hamper the credibility of the IDS. In the same manner, false
negatives, where the IDS did not generate an alarm and a threat did exist, degrade the
reliability of the IDS.

Signature based techniques produce accurate results but can be limited to historical attack
patterns. Relying solely on manual signature-based techniques would only be as good as the
latest known attack signature until the next signature update. Vendors who provide managed
services, claim that they can write the updates to new attacks within hours and update the
signature database in the client premises over the Internet. Anomaly detection techniques can
detect unknown attacks by analyzing normal traffic patterns of the network but are less
accurate than the signature-based techniques. A multi-dimensional intrusion detection
approach integrates intrusion detection models that combine anomaly and signature-based
techniques with policy deviation and state analysis.
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1.5.1. Intrusion Detection for Traditional Network
All computer activity and network traffic fall in one of three categories, including normal,
abnormal but not malicious, and malicious. Properly classifying these events is the single most
difficult problem, even more difficult than evidence collection. Two primary intrusion
detection models are the Network-based intrusion detection and the Host-based intrusion
detection. Network-based intrusion detection monitors network traffic for signs of misuse.
Host-based intrusion detection monitors computer processes for signs of misuse. Systems are
called "hybrid" systems if they do both. A hybrid IDS on a host may examine network traffic
to or from the host, as well as processes on that host.

Intrusion detection paradigms include the following:
•

Anomaly Detection

•

Misuse Detection

Among all, anomaly detection and misuse detection are the most common traditional intrusion
detection techniques. The following are summaries of the two techniques:

Anomaly Detection
An Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection System, is a system for detecting computer intrusions
and misuse by monitoring system activity and classifying it as either normal or anomalous.
The classification is based on heuristics or rules, rather than patterns or signatures, and will
detect any type of misuse that falls out with normal system operation. In order to determine
what attack traffic is, the system must be taught to recognize normal system activity. The
anomaly detector observes the activity of subjects and generates profiles for them that
represent their behavior. The audit records are processed, the system periodically generates a
value that is a measure of the abnormality of the profile. This value is a function of the
abnormality values of all the measures comprising the profile. The advantage of anomaly
intrusion detection is that well-studied techniques in statistics can often be applied. For
example, data points that lie beyond a multiple of the standard deviation on either side of the
mean might be considered anomalous. The integral of the absolute difference of two functions
over time might also be used as an indicator of the deviation of one function with respect to the
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other. The greatest disadvantage of anomaly detection is that it is difficult to determine
thresholds above which an anomaly should be considered intrusive. Setting a threshold too low
results in false positives and setting it too high results in false negatives.

Misuse Intrusion
Misuse intrusion detection refers to the detection of intrusions by precisely defining them
ahead of time and watching for their occurrence. Misuse detection is also sometimes referred to
as signature-based detection because alarms are generated based on specific attack signatures.
These attack signatures specify the features, conditions, arrangements and interrelationships
among events that lead the system to a break-in or other intrusive activity. Signatures are not
only useful to detect intrusions but also attempted intrusions. A partial satisfaction of a
signature may indicate an intrusion attempt. A misuse intrusion detector that simply flags
intrusions based on the pattern of input events assumes that the state transition of the system
leads to a compromised state when exercised with the intrusion pattern, regardless of the initial
state of the system. One of the major advantages of misuse detection system is that user can
examine the signature database, and quickly determine which intrusive activity the misuse
detection system is programmed to alert on. One of the biggest problems is maintaining state
information for signatures in which the intrusive activity encompasses multiple discrete events
(that is, the complete attack signature occurs in multiple packets on the network). Another
drawback is that your misuse detection system must have a signature defined for all of the
possible attacks that an attacker may launch against your system. This leads to the necessity for
frequent signature updates to keep the signature database of your misuse detection system upto-date.

1.5.1.1.

Intrusion Classification for Traditional (Wired) Network

According to (Bai and Kobayashi 2003), primarily there are four kinds of intrusions:
1. User to Root Attack (U2R)
2. Remote to User Attack (R2U)
3. Denial of Service Attack (DoS)
4. Probes Attack (Probes)
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The most severe attacks are categorized as U2R and the order of severity can be organized as
U2R > R2U > DoS > Probes. According to research it is found that current data mining based
IDSs are more useful on capturing DoS and Probes attacks than capturing U2R and R2U
attacks (Ezeife et al. 2008).

1.

User to Roof Attack:

This category consists of attacks where a local user on a machine is able to obtain privileges
normally reserved for the UNIX super user or the Windows NT administrator. The intruder
exploits some software vulnerabilities to gain root access. Examples of U2R attack are Eject
and Fbconfig (Radosavac and Baras 2003). The most common User to Root attack is buffer
overflow attack, which enables the attacker to run personal code on a target machine once the
boundary of a buffer has been exceeded, giving him the privileges of the overflowed program
(which in most cases is root). This type of attack usually tries to execute a shell with the
application's owner privileges. Some examples of those attacks are eject, ffbconfig etc
(Radosavac and Baras 2003).

2.

Remote to User Attack:

In this type of attack, the attacker does not have any user account in the victim system. By
exploiting some software vulnerabilities and sending network packets, the user gain normal
access and later he can launch U2R attack and gain root access. An example of this kind of
attack is Sendmail attack. The Sendmail attack exploits a buffer overflow in UNIX version
8.8.3 of sendmail and allows a remote attacker to execute commands with superuser privileges.
By sending a carefully crafted email message to a system running a vulnerable version of
sendmail, intruders can force sendmail to execute arbitrary commands with root privilege.
According to (Lincoln Laboratory MIT 2007), in this type of attack, the attacker sends a
carefully constructed mail message with a long MIME header field. Sendmail daemon
overflows during MIME processing and adds a new entry to the password file. Attacker comes
back later and finds that his mail message has given him a root account on the victim system.
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3.

Denial of Service Attack (DoS):

DoS is a type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the network down by flooding it
with useless traffic. Although a DoS attack does not usually result in the theft of information or
other security loss, it can cost the target person or company a great deal of time and money.
Typically, the loss of service is the inability of a particular network service, such as e-mail, to
be available or the temporary loss of all network connectivity and services. A denial of service
attack can also destroy programming and files in affected computer systems. In some cases,
DoS attacks have forced Web sites accessed by millions of people to temporarily cease
operation. Examples of this kind of attack are SYN flood attack, Teardrop attack, Smurf attack
etc (Lincoln Laboratory 2007).

4.

Probes Attack:

Probes attack itself does not do anything other than scanning all reachable ports of computers
in a network, gathers information, and looks for security holes in the network. Later this
information can be used to launch other types of attacks and cause more damage to the
network. Examples of this kind of scanning tools are Ipsweep, Mscan etc (Ezeife et al. 2008).
An Ipsweep attack is a surveillance sweep termine which hosts are listening on a network.
There are many methods an attacker can use to perform an Ipsweep attack. The most common
method is to send ICMP Ping packets to every possible address within a subnet and wait to see
which machines respond (Lincoln Laboratory 2007). Then, the attacker can determine which
ports on which machines are open and then he can plan to launch other attacks through those
open ports.

1.5.1.2.

Types of Attacks in Wireless Sensor Network:

Wireless sensor network is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks. In this section we will look
at the various kinds of WSN attacks as follows:

/.

MAC Address

Spoofing:

IEEE 802.11 has as a 48-bit MAC address in the same format as an IEEE 802.3 address and
similar to an Ethernet address. The 802.11 address is similar to the Ethernet's in both format
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and security. Since there is no validation of address, one can spoof addresses. Since almost all
wireless NICs permit changing their MAC address to an arbitrary value through vendorsupplied drivers, open-source drivers or various application programming frameworks, it is
trivial for an attacker to wreak havoc on a target wireless LAN. When an attacker changes
his/her MAC address they continue to utilize the wireless card for its intended layer 2
transport, transmitting and receiving from the same source MAC. A common example is an
attacker executing a brute-force attack script with a random MAC address for each successive
connection attempt. This kind of attack would go undetected by network activity analysis
applications that report upper-layer network activity or large quantities of traffic from a single
source of address (Wight 2003).

2.

Address Resolution

Protocol (ARP)

Poisoning:

When data are sent out onto a network, they need a way to find the destination. This is
accomplished on several layers, depending on how far the data need to travel. At the first layer,
there exists an address called the MAC address. This theoretically 100% unique vale is
systematically assigned to each and every network device that is produced. In other words,
every network card, router, and switch has a pseudo-serial number that distinguishes it from
every other network device in the world. However, the MAC address is used only to
communicate within local networking segments, which are called subnets. Once the data pass
through a router or switch to another network subnet, the next layer of addressing becomes
important. This is because the database is required to record every MAC address and its
location would be too large for quick processing. Instead, other technologies, such as DNS,
WINS, IP manage data flow the farther out the data travels. To facilitate this transmission of
data, ARP was designed to act as the intermediary between IP and MAC addresses.

ARP is responsible for managing the relationship between MAC addresses and the IP
addresses for network devices. This fundamental technology is part of the core of Internet
functionality. In fact, without it a network will fail to work. However, it has been discovered
that ARP information can be spoofed, or faked, to facilitate the control of all network data. The
MAC address to IP address table is usually stored locally on each computer. This helps speed
up data transfer because the MAC address doesn't have to be verified each and every time a
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device wants to communicate with another device. However, this advantage has a negative
side. By storing the MAC addresses in the ARP table, a potential weakness arises. A remote
hacker could control an ARP table of a computer and could change MAC to IP address entries,
which could cause traffic to be redirected from the correct target to a target of the hacker's
choice (Wight 2003).

3.

Deauthentication:

Any wireless client must first authenticate itself to the AP before further communication may
commence. The authentication framework is a message that allows clients and access points to
explicitly request deauthenticaiton from one another. Unfortunately, this message itself is not
authenticated using any key material. Consequently the attacker may spoof this message, either
pretending to be the access point or the client, and direct it to the other party. In response, the
access point or client will exit the authenticated state and will refuse all further packets until
authentication is reestablished (Bellardo and Savage 2003).

4.

Man-in-the

middle

attacks:

Placing a rogue AP (Access Point) within range of wireless stations is wireless-specific
variation of a man-in-the-middle attack. If the attacker knows the SSID in use by the network
(which is easily discoverable) and the rogue AP has enough strength, wireless users will have
no way of knowing that they are connecting to an unauthorized AP. Using a rogue AP, an
attacker can gain valuable information about the wireless network, such as authentication
requests, the secret key that may be in use, and so on. Often, the attacker will set up a laptop
with two wireless adaptors, in which one card is used by the rogue AP and the other is used to
forward requests through a wireless bridge to the legitimate AP. With a sufficiently strong
antenna, the rogue AP does not have to be located in close proximity to the legitimate AP. So,
for example, the attacker can run the rogue AP from a car or van parked some distance away
from the building. However, it is also common to set up hidden rogue APs (under desks, in
closets, etc.) close to and within the same physical area as the legitimate AP. Because of their
undetectable nature, the only defense against rogue APs is vigilance through frequent site
surveys using tools such as Netstumbler (Robert 2004) and AiroPeek (Wild Packets 2007), and
physical security.
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5.

Disassociation:

Since a client may be authenticated with multiple access points at once, the 802.11 standard
provides a special association message to allow the client and access point to agree which
access point shall have responsibility for forwarding packets to and from the wired network on
the client's behalf. As with authentication, association frames are unauthenticated, and 802.11
provides a disassociation message similar to the deauthentication message described earlier.
Exploiting this vulnerability is functionally identical to the deauthentication attack. However, it
is worth noting that the disassociation attack is slightly less efficient than the deauthentication
attack. This is because deauthentication forces the victim node to do more work to return to the
associated state that does disassociation, ultimately requiring less work on the part of the attack
(Bellardo and Savage 2003).

6.

Wormhole

Attack:

The wormhole (Kwok 2003) attack is possible even if the attack has not compromised any
host, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole
attack, an attacker records packets at one location in the network, tunnels them to another
location, and retransmits the packets into the network at the later location. The wormhole
attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad-hoc network
routing protocols and location based wireless security systems. Wireless security protocol
based on localization have the potential to detect wormhole attacks. Localization systems are
based on verifying the relative locations of nodes in a wireless network. Knowing the relative
location may help conclude whether or not packets are sent from a node or a wormhole.

7.

Network Injection

Attack:

The network injection attack is a kind of DoS attack which exploits improperly configured
wireless LANs or rogue access points to target the entire network. When an access point is
attached to an unfiltered part of the enterprise network, it broadcasts network traffic, such as
"Spanning Tree" (802.ID), OSPF, RIP, HSRP (CISCO 2007) and other broadcast or multicast
traffic. By doing this, the packets invite attacks that take down wireless and wired network
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equipment and spur a meltdown of the entire internal network infrastructure, including hubs,
switches and routers.

8.

RTS/CTS Flood:

Request to Send and Clear to Send flood are like SYN flood in TCP for wired network (Hu et
al. 2003). In SYN-flood attack, SYN packet is sent to target and target returns an ACK packet
to cause a half-open connection. If the attacker keeps sending SYN packets it can cause a DoS
attack till timeouts occur. Similarly in 802.11, a flood of RTS packets can lead to DoS attack
since only a finite number of connections can be open at any given time.

9.

Jamming

attacks:

Jamming is a special kind of DoS attack specific to wireless networks. Jamming occurs when
spurious RF (Radio Frequency) frequencies interfere with the operation of the wireless
network. In some cases, the jamming is not malicious and is caused by the presence of other
devices, such as cordless phones, that operate in the same frequency as the wireless network.
In a case like this, the administrator must devise and implement policies regarding the use of
these devices or choose wireless hardware that uses different frequencies. Intentional and
malicious jamming occurs when an attacker analyzes the spectrum being used by wireless
networks and then transmits a powerful signal to interfere with communication on the
discovered frequencies. Fortunately, this kind of attack is not very common because of the
expense of acquiring hardware capable of launching jamming attacks. Plus, jamming a
network represents a kind of Pyrrhic victory for the attacker since it leads to a lot of time and
effort being expended merely to disable communications for a while (Rahman 2008).
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2.

Related Works Using Data Mining Techniques:

From the data centric point of view, we can consider intrusion as a data analysis process.
Anomaly detection is about finding normal usage patterns from audit data, whereas misuse
detection is about finding the patterns of intrusion, and then using these patterns to inspect
audit data. Audit data can be obtained from many sources. Using these audit data we can
implement data mining approach to wireless network intrusion detection which provides an
opportunity to learn the behaviors of network users' activity. To gain insight into the overall
distribution patterns and interesting correlations among sensor network attributes, different
researchers have used different data mining approaches. Association, Classification and
Clustering: three methods of data mining have been used largely in the field of network
intrusion detection from the very beginning (Ma et al. 2004; Rahman 2008). Among them
Association rule was the widely used technique in many models including ADAM (Barbara et
al. 2001), MADAM ID (Lee and Stolfo 2000), LERAD (Mahoney and Chan 2003), MINDS
(Ertoz et al. 2004) etc. We have investigated several research papers of various researchers
who used different model names which have been implemented to different data mining
techniques as follows:

2.1. Association Rule Concept:
An association rule is mainly a mathematical rule of the form {A,} -> {By} which is found
useful in data mining based NIDS (Ezeife et al. 2008). In the database, the association between
data items (e.g., A/, By) means that we can infer that particular data item (e.g., By) is in
existence because of the appearance of some data items (e.g., A,) in a transaction. Association
rule mining is used to discover correlation relationships among items in transaction data. An
example of transaction data from a bookstore is shown in table 1.
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Transaction ID (TID)

Items

1

book, paper, pencil

2

file, pen, pencil

3

file, paper, pen, pencil

4

file, pen
Table 1: Sample Transaction data

Let us discuss the association rule in a mathematical form. Here are some standard definitions
of association rule related terms from (Dunham 2003; Ezeife et al. 2008):

Given a set of items / = {Ij, I2,

, lmj and a database of transactions D = {tj, t2,

, t„} where

ti = {In, la, ..... Iikj and Iy el, an association rule is an implication of the formX -> Y where X,
Y czl are sets of items called itemsets and X nY = 0.

The support for an association ruleX -> Fis the percentage of transactions in the database that
contain X u Y. The support parameter can be used to determine how often the rule is applied.

The confidence or strength for an association rule X -> Y is the ratio of the number of
transactions that contain X u Y to the number of transactions that contain X. The confidence
parameter can be used to determine how often the rule is correct.

For example, using table 1, the itemset / = {book, file, paper, pen, pencil}. We can find that
{file, pen} occurs in transaction 2, 3 and 4. So, if we make a rule Mkefile ->pen, the support of
this rule will be 3/4*100% = 75%, which means 75% of all customers buy both items.

The confidence of the rule file -> pen will be the ratio of the number of transactions that
contain {file, pen} to the number of transactions that contain {file}. Transaction number 2, 3
and 4 contain {file, pen} and transaction number 2, 3 and 4 contain {file}. So, confidence of
this rule would be 3/3*100% = 100%, that means 100% of customers who buy file also buy
pen, meaning the rule has 100% accuracy.
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Through next several sub-sections we will discuss two important Association Rule Mining
algorithms: Apriori, FP-growth algorithm and frequent episode rules, which are commonly
used for Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).

2.1.1. NIDS Using Association-Rule Mining:
Association-rule mining finds interesting association or correlation relationships among a large
sets of data items. With massive amounts of data continuously being collected and stored, the
discovery of interesting association relationships among huge amount of transaction records
can help in making decisions (Han and Kamber 2001). A well known example is market basket
analysis. It analyzes customer buying habits by finding association between the different items
that customer place in their shopper baskets. If most customers who buy milk also buy bread,
then we can put milk and bread oh the same shelf to increase the profit. Here we will examine
a few researchers' approaches using association rules in intrusion detection system for wired
networks which may provide the conception of its implementation in wireless sensor networks.

2.1.1.1

ADAM

In (Barbara et al. 2001) the authors present an architecture of data mining based intrusion
system ADAM (Audit Data Analysis and Mining). In ADAM they use a combination of
association rules to detect any attack in a TCP Dump audit trails. ADAM is developed at
George Mason University of USA. They introduce the approach that any event flagged by the
association rules module that cannot be classified as a known attack or as a normal event (false
alarm) by the classifier, ought to be considered, conservatively, as an unknown attack. Using
this assumption, authors change the label in the classifier from "default" to "unknown".

First, ADAM collects normal, known frequent datasets by mining into this model. Secondly, it
runs an on-line algorithm to find last frequent connections and compare them with the known
mined data and discards those which seem to be normal. With the suspicious ones it then uses a
classifier which is previously trained to classify the suspicious connections as a known type of
attack, unknown type of attack or a false alarm. There are two phases in this experimental
model. In the first phase they trained the classifier. This phase takes place only once offline
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before using the system. In the second phase they use the trained classifier to detect intrusions.
The algorithm with example [Rahman 2008] is described below.

attack free
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and
domain-level mining

on-line single level
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label kemsets
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Figure 11: Training phase of ADAM

Phase 1:
In the first phase, attack free normal frequent datasets are used to build a normal
profile, where a minimum support is specified. For example, we have a database
consisting of attack free connections. The schema of the database is shown in Table 2.

Time stamp Source IP Source Port Destination IP Destination port Flag Service
Table 2: Schema of attack free database to be used to build attack free normal profile

Now suppose for some specified minimum support (for instance 60%) we collect only
those connections those have a support greater than the minimum support. And we
build a profile of normal connections. For example, the normal profile might be like
table 3.
Time stamp Source IP

Source Port Destination IP Destination port Flag

TO

137.207.34.1

80

Tl

137.207.34.1 25

Service

168.212.22.3

80

ACK http

207.34.56.2

25

ACK telnet

Table 3: Sample of normal profile
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Then in the second step again training data and the already built normal profile are used
with an online algorithm of tunable size. From the training data, association rules are
generated in the form of X-> Y. Suppose, in some specified period of time a rule
(src_IP = 137.207.34.1, src_port = 80 -> service = http) is getting strong support.
Then this rule will be checked in the normal profile, if the rule is present then it will be
ignored. In this case it will be ignored since it matches with the normal profile. But for
instance, if we see that a rule {destJP = 137.207.34.1, destjport = 80 ->flag = SYN)
(which is actually a signature of SYN flood attack) is getting strong support within a
specified time window and this does not match with any normal profile data, a counter
is used to track the support that the itemset received. If the support crosses the
threshold, then it will be reported as suspicious.

Then the features of the raw data corresponding to these suspicious itemsets are located and
used to train the classifier by classifying them as false alarms or attacks.

Phase 2:
•

In this phase, the classifier is already trained and can categorize any attack as known or
false alarm. The attacks that are not specified in the classifier are labeled as unknown
attacks. Here, also the same dynamic on-line algorithm is used to produce suspicious
data with the help of normal profile and trained classifier. If it is false alarm then the
classifier excludes those from the attack list and does not send those to system
monitoring officer.
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Figure 12: Discovering intrusions with ADAM

The authors used DARPA 1999 datasets in their experiment. The authors claimed that ADAM
is very successful in detecting DOS, PROBE, U2L attack but their system could not detect
U2R attacks. The main deficiency in the approach is that they used only association rules and
as a result their classifier generated a lot of rules, among them many were redundant. Another
weakness of ADAM is that it totally depends on attack free normal training data, which are
difficult to get.

2.1.1.2.

MINDS

In (Ertoz et al. 2004) the authors present MINDS (Minnesota Intrusion Detection System)
which was developed at the department of computer science in University of Minnesota. To the
best of our knowledge MINDS is one of the best unsupervised anomaly detection system
which is based on statistical approaches, clustering, outlier detection schemes etc. In this paper
the authors have presented an unsupervised anomaly detection technique that assigns a score to
each network connection that reflects how anomalous the connection is, and an association
pattern analysis based module that summarizes those network connections that are ranked
highly anomalous by the anomaly detection module. The brief workflow of the MINDS
[Rahman 2008] is as follows:
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Figure 13: MINDS System

Input:
Input to the MINDS is Netflow version 5 data collected using flow tool (for details refer to
(www.splintered.net/sw/flow-tools) which is an alternative to tcpDump data. Flow-tools only
capture packet header information, not the message contents. Just like tcp dump data header
information contains source ip, source port, destination ip, destination port, time stump, flag
values, duration of the connection etc. They have used 10 minutes time window. All data in the
internet are passed as packets. All these packets have some header information and data. The
system only captures the header information for all of those packets that have passed in last 10
minutes. Those data are stored and before they are fed into the main system a data filtering step
is performed to remove network traffic that the analyst is not interested in analyzing. For
example, filtered data may include traffic from trusted sources. For example, in University of
Windsor, when an access request to port numbers between 40000 and 60000 comes from
UofW campus network it is granted, otherwise if the source IP is not from the university
network, the access is denied. More precisely, if somebody tries to access port 40001 with
http://cs.uwindsor.ca:40001 from home, then the request is denied but is granted if the request
is coming from university lab computers.
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Step 1: Feature Construction
The first step in MINDS main system is "feature extraction". The data are in the binary format
but we know the format (which bytes are representing what) and we extract those basic
features from the audit data. These basic features include source and destination IP address,
source and destination ports, protocol, flags, number of bytes and number of packets. With
these basic features then derived features are computed. There are two types of derived
features, (1) time window based features and (2) connection window based features. Time
window based features are constructed to capture connections with similar characteristics
within the last T seconds. For example, how many connections were destined towards the same
destination IP address in last T seconds is called count-dest. Connection window based features
are constructed to capture connection with similar characteristics within last N connection. For
example, within last N connection how many connections were destined towards the same
destination IP address is called count-dest-conn. Sample features of both type features are
presented below in table 4 and table 5.

Feature

Feature Description

name
count-dest

Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in the last
T seconds from the same source

count-src

Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the last
T seconds to the same destination

count-servsrc
count-servdest

Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last T
seconds
Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source port in last
T seconds
Table 4: Time-window based features
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Feature name

Feature Description

count-dest-conn

Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in the
last N flows from the same source

count-src-conn

Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the
last N flows to the same destination

count-serv-srcconn

Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last N
flows

count-serv-dest- Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source port in
conn

last N flows
Table 5: Connection-window based features

Step 2: Known Attack Detection
After all features of connection have been derived then the next step is to compare those
features with known anomalies. If it finds a match then it directly send it to the analysts.

For example, suppose it is known from time-window based features that one single source IP is
trying to access the same port in many destination IPs many times within the last 3 seconds and
if there is existing signature of this kind of attack then it can be sent to analyst as an attack
without any hesitation. Now if there is no known attack signature of this kind then we send that
connection record to Anomaly Detection module, which will be the next step.

Step 3: Anomaly Detection
In this step Anomaly Detection module will use an outlier detection algorithm to assign an
anomaly score to each network connection. It assigns a degree of being an outlier to each data
point, which is called Local Outlier Factor (LOF) (Breunig et al. 2000). For each data example,
the density of the neighborhood is first computed. The LOF of a specific data example p
represents the average of the ratios of the density of the example p and the density of its
neighbors. LOF requires the neighborhood of all data points be constructed. This involves
calculating pairwise distances between all data points, which is 0(n 2 ) complexity. As there
could be a million data sets, the complexity will be huge. To reduce the complexity an
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approach has been taken in MINDS. They have made a sample dataset from the data and all
data points are compared with the small set, which reduces the complexity to 0(n*m), where m
is the size of small dataset.

Figure 14: Local Outlier Factor (LOF) approach

For example, in the figure 17 we can see that cluster C2 is denser than CI. Due to the low
density in cluster CI, for most examples q inside CI, the distance between any dataset and its
neighbor is greater than that of CI. For example, the distance between pi and p3 is higher than
the distance between p2 and p4. So, therefore p2 will not be considered as outlier.

Step 4: Association Pattern Analysis
After assigning each connection a score then top 10% scores are taken as anomaly class and
bottom 30% scores are taken as normal class. Middle 60% scores are ignored in their system.
Then, these scored connections are passed into the Association Pattern Generator.

This module summarizes network connections that are ranked highly anomalous by the
anomaly detection module. The goal of mining association patterns is to discover patterns that
occur frequently in anomaly class or in normal class. In this step they have applied association
rule to construct rulesets for anomaly class and for normal class. For example, scanning
activity for a particular service can be summarized by a frequent set:
sourceIP=X, destinationPort=Y
If most of the connections in the frequent set are ranked high by previous step, then this
frequent set may be a candidate signature for addition to a signature-based system. Or, if the
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following frequent set is scored lower and appeared many times then we can say it is normal
which is a web browsing activity. The web browsing activity can be summarized as a frequent
rule set:
Protocol=TCP, destinationPort=80, NumPackets=3.. .6

Then, in the last step summary of all rules are presented in front of analyst and then analyst can
update or build normal profile or can label a new attack signatures. This is how the MINDS
woks as an unsupervised anomaly detection system. One limitation of MINDS is that it only
analyzes the header parts of data and does not pay attention to payload. As a result, U2R or
R2U attacks may go undetected in their system.

2.2.

Cluster Analysis Concept:

Clustering is a major data mining technique which is widely used in network intrusion
detection purposes. Clustering is a process of partitioning a set of data or objects into groups of
similar objects. Each group, called cluster, consists of objects that are similar among
themselves and dissimilar to objects of other groups.
Traditionally, clustering techniques are broadly divided in hierarchical and partitioning
(Berkhin 2003). Hierarchical clustering is further subdivided into agglomerative and divisive.
While hierarchical algorithms build clusters gradually (as crystals are grown), partitioning
algorithms learn clusters directly. In doing so, they either try to discover clusters by iteratively
relocating points between subsets, or try to identify clusters as areas highly populated with data
(Berkhin 2003). In this section we will discuss a popular clustering algorithm, K-means
clustering, which falls under partitioning clustering method.

K-Means Clustering:
The K-means algorithm takes the input parameter, k, and partitions a set of n objects into k
clusters so that the resulting intra-cluster (objects within the same cluster) similarity is high but
the inter-cluster similarity (objects residing in different clusters) is low. Cluster similarity is
measured with regards to the mean value of the objects in a cluster, which can be viewed as the
cluster's center of gravity.
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Algorithm: &-means. The &-means algorithm for partitioning based ori the mean value of the
objects in the cluster.
Input: The number of clusters k and a database containing n objects.
Output: A set of k clusters that minimizes the squared-error criterion.
Method:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

arbitrary choose k objects as the initial cluster centers;
repeat
(re)assign each object to the cluster to which the object is the most similar,
based on the mean value of the objects in the cluster;
update the cluster means, i.e., calculate the mean value of the objects for
each cluster;
until no changes;
Figure 15: K-Means algorithm

For example, we have 5 datasets in two 2-dimensional spaces. The sample input data is
described in figure 16 and the number of cluster, k, is 2.

Data Point

Array 1

Array 2

1

22

21

2

19

20

3

18

22

4

1

3

5

4

2

Figure 16: Sample dataset for K-Means algorithm
Initially, we choose two arbitrary centre points (18,22) and (4,2) as centroids for Ci (cluster 1)
and C2 (cluster 2). To determine the Euclidean distance of a dataset P = (Pi, P2, . . . , Pn) from a
centroid Q = (Qi, Q2, . . . , Qn), the formula is:

\j{p\ - qi)2 + (P2 - ga)2 + • • • + (Pn - qnf = A J2(Pi - qi}2\h=i
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Iteration 1:
We will have to check the Euclidean distance of every point (e.g., 22,21)from both centroids
Ci(18,22) and C2(4,2) and the point will be assigned to the cluster it has lowest distance with.

For Point 1,(22,21):
Distance from centroid C,: V{(22-18)2 + (21-22)2} = Vl7 = 4.12
Distance from centroid C2: V{(22-4)2 + (21-2)2} = A/6517 = 80.72
So, point 1 is assigned to C|.

In the same way point 2 and point 3 are assigned to Cj and point 4 and point 5 are assigned to
C2.

So, Cluster 1, d = {point 1, point 2, point 3} = {(22,21), (19,20), (18,22)}
Cluster 2, C 2 = {point 4, point 5} = {(1,3), (4,2)}

Now, we calculate the new centroids for the clusters.
New centroid for Cx: {(22,21) + (19,20) + (18,22)} / 3 = (20,21)
New centroid for C2: {(1,3) + (4,2)} / 2 = (3,3)

Iteration 2:
We will have to check the distance of every point from both centroids and the point will be
assigned to the cluster it has lowest distance with.

For Point 1,(22,21):
Distance from C,: V{(22-20)2 + (21-21)2} = 2
Distance from C2: V{(22-3)2 + (21-3)2} - V685 = 26.17
So, point 1 is assigned to C\.
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In the same way point 2 and point 3 are assigned to C\ and point 4 and point 5 are assigned to
C2.
So, Cluster 1, C, = {point 1, point 2, point 3} = {(22,21), (19,20), (18,22)}
Cluster 2, C 2 = {point 4, point 5} = {(1,3), (4,2)}

Now, we calculate the new centroids for the clusters.
New centroid for C,: {(22,21) + (19,20) + (18,22)} / 3 = (20,21)
New centroid for C 2 : {(1,3) + (4,2)} / 2 = (3,3)

Since the clusters and centroids remain unchanged, we will stop here. The final clusters will
look like figure 17.
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Figure 17: K-Means Example
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2.2.1. NIDS Using Cluster Analysis
The process of grouping a set of physical or abstract objects into classes of similar objects is
called clustering. A cluster of data objects can be treated collectively as one group in many
applications. By clustering, one can identify dense and sparse regions and discover overall
distribution patterns and interesting correlations among data attributes using different
algorithms. We found in our investigation that the researchers are highly motivated and
clustering analysis can serve as a first step for other analysis or mining operations on the
detected clusters and even performance tuning of the sensor networks.
In the research paper (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005), the authors extended their previous work by
clustering wireless traffic data and use heuristics to label each instance as intrusion or normal.
The authors identified the problems that there are security vulnerabilities of 802.11 wireless
networks for leading to a summary of network traffic metrics relevant to modeling the security
of wireless networks. The heuristics they used are similar to their previous work in which
clusters are ordered according to the largest cluster and a percentage cutoff is used to determine
the separation point between attacks and normal clusters. The assumption here is that the
largest cluster will have normal instances whereas anomalous or intrusive instances would
belong to clusters far away from the largest cluster. In their study they use a distance-based cut
off instead percentage cutoff. They applied the online k-means clustering algorithm to the three
datasets for three different maximum number of clusters, i.e., k = 15, 30, 50 clusters. Initially,
all metrics were used during clustering with the numeric features scaled to [0,1] and the
categorical features -day, time slot, and access point - represented by the 1-of-N encoding
approach. This encoding increased the number of features to 178 dimensions. The clusters that
are relatively farther from the largest clusters are usually small in size and could constitute as
anomalies or intrusions.
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CttSidriCe
Figure 18: Distance to largest cluster

The cluster distances from the largest cluster plotted against the log of cluster size is shown in
Figure - 18. The figure aids in identifying the normal clusters according to our conservative
assumption that very large clusters cannot be attacks. Their study also investigated the use of
tracers (records with known normal or intrusive levels) to enhance intrusion detection
performance. They showed that the small set of tracers can significantly improve the intrusion
detection rate of their cluster-based approach. Authors claim that their approach is one of the
first studies to investigate a tracer-based clustering approach with expert analysis for intrusion
detection in WLANs. They suggested that the future studies can investigate using tracers to
isolate different intrusion or attack types among the intrusive clusters.

The input data (http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~mbalazin/wireless) for their work was a wireless logs
obtained from more than 170 access points spread over three buildings. The raw data was
summarized into connection-oriented records by pairing up the Mac address that uniquely
identifies the client with the access point to which it is connected. The wireless network used
for data collection was operating in the infrastructure mode with clients connected via the
access points. The following attributes in table 6 are used in their data collection process.
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Site
Day
Moment
AP_Name
SysUpTime
SnmpInPkts
SnmpOutPkts
Ipln
IpOut
IpFwd
Tcpln
TcpOut
Udpln
UdpOut

string
Date
Time
String
Time
Int
Int
Int
Int
Int
Int
Int
Int
Int

Table 6: Data Collection Attributes

K-Means is a widely used algorithm that minimizes the mean-squared error (MSE) objective
function. K-means is popular algorithm due to its simplicity, low time complexity, and fast
convergence (Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005). The authors have shown in their previous work
(Khoshgoftaar et al. 2005) that Online K-means not only outperforms batch K-means in
clustering quality but is also more efficient.

After preprocessing the data they have applied the online K-means algorithm to find the
clusters from the wireless log data. We will now explain their online K-mean algorithm with an
example (Ejelike 2008). Following table 7 represents the input data.

Site

Day

Moment

AP

SysUpTime

SnmpInPkts

SnmpOutPkts

Ipln

IpOut

IpFwd

Tcpln

TcpOut

Udpln

UdpOut

LBdg

2.7.20

00:05:07

API

3:1:57:12.0

523976

522317

984212

528030

0

1911

1911

523187

524183

MBdg

2.7.20

00:10:07

AP2

3:2:02:12.0

524444

522783

984744

528498

0

1911

1911

523653

524649

Table 7: Sample Input data for clustering

We can only use numeric values for Clustering. Therefore the site and AP name attributes
which are of string data type in the sample data have to be converted to numeric data type. The
authors used 1-of-N encoding, which assigns the same weight to each category and requires as
many numeric places as there are categories. For example, Site with 3 nominal values (LBldg,
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MBldg, SBldg) would be assigned 100, 010, and 001 respectively. LBldgAP and MBldgAP
will be assigned 200 and 020 respectively, and any other APname would be 002.

Suppose our Input dataset has 4 dimensions and the cluster has 2 points L, M, and a centroid P;
L = (Li, La, ... , L4),M = (M,, M2, .... , M4), and P = (P,,P2, ... , P4). Pi = (L,+Mi)/2, P2 =
(L2+M2)/2, P3 = (L3+M3)/2, P4 = (L4+M4)/2.
The cluster centroid is randomly selected, each point in the matrix is assigned to the nearest
cluster center and then a new centroid for each cluster is recalculated using the new cluster
member values. For example, we will use a simple sample dataset for easy calculation to show
how the online K-Means algorithm works. Assuming we transform the sample input data in
Table 8, to make use of only five attributes from the sample input as shown in following Table.

Connection Record Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4
Coni

5

3

2

1

Con2

6

6

3

1

Table 8: Sample connection records for kmo algorithm

Each record Coni, Con2 represents one point with 4 attributes.
1.

Initial value of centroids (Initialization): Let C| and C2 denote randomly selected

centroids, with Ci = (3,3,3,3) and C2 = (2,2,2,2). We are using a cluster with 2 points, therefore
our K (number of clusters) = 2.

2.

Objects-Centroids Distance: The distance between cluster centroid to each object is

calculated using Euclidean distance. Then, distance matrix at iteration 0 will be

E= J_S|| X n-Hyn|| 2

(1)

N
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Where y„ = arg min* \\x„ - |i J \ is the cluster identity of data vector x„ and [i^ is the centroid

of cluster j„. II II represents L2 norm.
Let L; and M, = Coni, Con2 respectively and since we want to cluster the connection records in
two clusters Ci and C2, as shown in Figure 19 below;

k

^

Ci

Ci

5

6

3

2

3

6

3

2

2

3

3

2

1

1

3

2

Figure 19: Matrix representation of CI and C2 at 0 iteration

Then the distances between the columns in Table 8 is calculated as follows using equation 1;
d (L;, d ) = V{(5-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (2-3)2 + ( 1-3)2 } = ^9 = 3

d (Mj, C ) - V {(6-3)2 + (6-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (1-3)2} = V22 = 4.69

d (Li,C2) = V{(5-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (2-2)2 + ( 1-2)2 }= yjn = 3.32

d (Mj, C2) = V {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (1-2) 2 }= ^34 = 5.83
Do represents distance at iteration 0, therefore our matrix at iteration 0 for the instance Ci is:
D0 = [3
3.

4.69]

Objects clustering: The difference between online K-Means and normal K-Means is

that, normal K-Means will assign all instances (connection records) to a cluster and then update
the centroid. But, with online K-Means centroid is updated after assigning each instance to a
cluster. The aim is to move the cluster point closer to the vector instance. Based on the
minimum distance, Coni is assigned to group 1 as shown in Table 9.
44

c

1

o=

0

= group 1
= group 2

Table 9: Object clustering generating cluster (C0)

Ci = (3,3,3,3) group 1
C2 = (2,2,2,2) group 2
4. Determine a new centroid. It uses equation 2 below to calculate the new centroid position:
(new)
M"vn

^ y n - dE_ = f^yn + 2 ( x n- M-yn)

(2)

djiyn
£ is a learning rate that takes a small positive number (e.g., 0.05) or gradually decreases in the
learning process

jXyn = 4, S = 0.05. Since there are no objects in group 2, the centroid at group 2 will remain
unchanged at (2, 2, 2, 2). The new centroid JHvn

(new)

be as follows;
(new)
jLlynV
' = 3 + 0.05 ((5-3)+ (3-3)+ (2-3)+ (1-3))

rlyn^6^

= 3 +

°- 05 (_1 ) = 2 - 9 5
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(new center position) for group 1 will

After recalculating the centroid, group 1 has the new centroid 2.95. Group 2 centroid remains
unchanged as no objects are assigned to it. Our new matrix for first iteration is shown in Figure
20.

k

^

Ci

Ca

5

6

2.95

2

3

6

2.95

2

2

3

2.95

2

1

1

2.95

2

Figure 20: Matrix records for iterationl

The next object (R2) will now be allocated to a cluster. The object-centroid distance is now
calculated as shown in No. 2.

Dl (Mj, CI) = V {(6-2.95)2 + (6-2.95)2 + (3-2.95)2 + (1-2.95)2 } = V22.41 = 4.73
Dj (Mj,C2) = V {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (1-2)2 } = «^34= 5.83
Di represents distance at iteration 1.
Dl = [4.73

5.83]

Based on the minimum distance, Con2 is assigned to group 1.

c

1
l=

_0

= group 1
= group 2

Table 10: Object clustering generating cluster (Ci)

The two records Coni and Con2 are now assigned to group 1. New centroid for group 1 is
recomputed, group 2 centroid will still remain the same since no object is assigned to it. The
re-computation of cluster centroid continues until each group remains unchanged.

•

To separate intrusive objects from normal instances;
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Find the largest cluster, i.e., the one with the most number of instances, and
label it normal. Assume its centroid is jua

•

Sort the remaining clusters in ascending order of the distance from each cluster centroid
to ju0. Within a cluster, sort the data instances in the same way (i.e., ascending order of
distance from each data instance to ju0).

•

Select all clusters that have a distance (to ju0) greater than t)D, and label them as
intrusive where D is the largest distance from the centroid of the largest cluster to the
farthest instance in y and rj is the portion of the instances farthest away from the largest
cluster.

•

Label all the other instances as attacks.

Assume group i is the largest cluster with a centroid (i0 of 3. D is 3.23 and rj = 0.17 then yD =
0.55. So it means that any cluster that the distance from centroid u0 of group 1 is greater than
0.55 will be labeled as intrusive cluster.

To measure the performance (accuracy) of the proposed clustering-based intrusion detection
approach, they ask a wireless network expert to assign normal or intrusive label to each cluster.
The expert was given the average statistics of each feature for a cluster, but not the distance
relationship between clusters. The expert categorized each cluster solely based on his
understanding of the relationship between metrics and attacks. The set of expert-assigned
labels are then used as the "ground truth" for the evaluation of their clustering based methods.
They have done experiments on their system with three weeks datasets and claimed that the
effectiveness of the clustering-based wireless intrusion detection method was validated.
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2.3.

Classification Rule Concept:

Intrusion detection can be thought of as a classification problem: we wish to classify each audit
record into one of a discrete set of possible categories, normal or a particular kind of intrusion.
Given a set of records, where one of the features is the class label (i.e., the concept),
classification algorithms can compute a model that uses the most discriminating feature values
to describe each concept.

2.3.1. Neural Networks:
Neural Networks are analytic techniques modeled after the processes of learning in the
cognitive system which is capable of predicting new observations on specific variables from
other observations on the same or other variables after executing a process of so-called
learning from existing data (Han and Kamber 2005). Pattern recognition is one of the most
common uses for neural networks. Pattern recognition is a form of classification. A neural
network trained for classification is designed to take input samples and classify them into
groups. Therefore we can classify the Neural Network into Classification Techniques in data
mining (Han and Kamber 2005). We have used the Neural Network techniques in our proposed
system.

We are going to describe briefly the Neural Network basics in the rest of this section and also
the training algorithm called Back-Propagation in the following section. After a briefing of
Neural Network basics, we will go through our proposed system in section 3.

Neural Network (NN) is an interconnected group of artificial neurons that uses a mathematical
or computational model for information processing based on a connectionistic approach to
computation (Dunham 2003). In most cases a Neural Network is an adaptive system that
changes its structure based on external or internal information that flows through the network.
In more practical terms neural networks are non-linear statistical data modeling or decision
making tools. They can be used to model complex relationships between inputs and outputs or
to find patterns in data.
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Neural Networks are very sophisticated modeling techniques capable of modeling extremely
complex functions (Ramadas et al. 2003). The neural network user gathers representative data,
and then invokes training algorithms to automatically learn the structure of the data. Although
the user does need to have some heuristic knowledge of how to select and prepare data, how to
select an appropriate neural network, and how to interpret the results, the level of user
knowledge needed to successfully apply neural networks is much lower than would be the case
using some more traditional nonlinear statistical methods.

The most common neural network model is the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). This type of
neural network is known as a supervised network because it requires a desired output in order
to learn. The goal of this type of network is to create a model that correctly maps the input to
the output using historical data so that the model can then be used to produce the output when
the desired output is unknown. A graphical representation of an MLP is shown below.

Input
Lajer

First
Hidden
La^er

Second
Hidden
La^er

Output
Lajpr

Figure 21: Multilayer Perceptron [MLP] Model

The above figure 21 is of a two hidden layer multiplayer perceptron (MLP). The inputs are fed
into the input layer and get multiplied by interconnection weights as they are passed from the
input layer to the first hidden layer. Within the first hidden layer, they get summed then
processed by a nonlinear function. As the processed data leave the first hidden layer, again they
get multiplied by interconnection weights, then summed and processed by the second hidden
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layer. Finally, the data are multiplied by interconnection weights then processed one last time
within the output layer to produce the neural network output.

The MLP and many other neural networks learn using an algorithm called back-propagation.
With back-propagation, the input data are repeatedly presented to the neural network. With
each presentation the output of the neural network is compared to the desired output and an
error is computed. This error is then fed back (back-propagated) to the neural network and used
to adjust the weights such that the error decreases with each iteration and the neural model gets
closer and closer to producing the desired output. This process is known as "training".
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Figure 22: Neural Network Learning for XOR Data

The above diagram Demonstrates a neural network learning to model the exclusive-or (XOR)
data. The XOR data is repeatedly presented to the neural network. With each presentation, the
error between the network output and the desired output is computed and fed back to the neural
network. The neural network uses this error to adjust its weights such that the error will be
decreased. This sequence of events is usually repeated until an acceptable error has been
reached or until the network no longer appears to be learning.

2.3.1.1.

Applications for Neural Networks:

Neural networks are applicable in virtually every situation in which a relationship between the
predictor variables (independents, inputs) and predicted variables (dependents, outputs) exists,
even when that relationship is very complex and not easy to articulate in the usual terms of
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"correlations" or "differences between groups." A few representative examples of problems to
which neural network analysis has been applied successfully are:

•

Detection of medical phenomena. A variety of health-related indices (e.g., a

combination of heart rate, levels of various substances in the blood, respiration rate) can be
monitored. The onset of a particular medical condition could be associated with a very
complex (e.g., nonlinear and interactive) combination of changes on a subset of the variables
being monitored. Neural networks have been used to recognize this predictive pattern so that
the appropriate treatment can be prescribed.

•

Stock market prediction. Fluctuations of stock prices and stock indices are another

example of a complex, multidimensional, but in some circumstances at least partiallydeterministic phenomenon. Neural networks are being used by many technical analysts to
make predictions about stock prices based upon a large number of factors such as past
performance of other stocks and various economic indicators.

•

Credit assignment. A variety of pieces of information are usually known about an

applicant for a loan. For instance, the applicant's age, education, occupation, and many other
facts may be available. After training a neural network on historical data, neural network
analysis can identify the most relevant characteristics and use those to classify applicants as
good or bad credit risks.

•

Monitoring the condition of machinery. Neural networks can be instrumental in

cutting costs by bringing additional expertise to scheduling the preventive maintenance of
machines. A neural network can be trained to distinguish between the sounds a machine makes
when it is running normally ("false alarms") versus when it is on the verge of a problem. After
this training period, the expertise of the network can be used to warn a technician of an
upcoming breakdown, before it occurs and causes costly unforeseen "downtime."
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«

Engine management. Neural networks have been used to analyze the input of sensors

from an engine. The neural network controls the various parameters within which the engine
functions, in order to achieve a particular goal, such as minimizing fuel consumption.

2.3.1.2.

Back-Propagation Algorithm

Back-Propagation learns by iteratively processing a set of training samples, comparing the
network's prediction for each sample with the actual known class level. For each training
sample, the weights are modified so as to minimize the mean squared error between the
network's prediction and the actual class (Han and Kamber 2005). These modifications are made
in the backwards direction, from the output layer, through each hidden layer down to the first
hidden layer.

We have implemented the back propagation algorithm in our proposed system for training
purpose is summarized in the following figure 23:

Algorithm: Backpropagation. Neural Learning for classification, using the backpropagation
algorithm.
Input: The training samples, samples; learning rate, /; a multilayer feed-forward network,
network.
Output: A neural network trained to classify the samples.
Method:
(1)
Initialize all weights and biases in network;
(2)
while terminating condition in not satisfied {
(3)
for each training sample X in samples {
(4)
// Propagate the inputs forward:
for each hidden or output layer unit j {
(5)
(6)
Ij = YJ wy Oi + Of //compute the net input of unit j with respect to
the previous layer, i
Oi = 1 / 1 + e~'J ; } // compute the output of each unit j
(7)
// Backpropagate the errors:
(8)
for each unit j in the output layer
(9)
(10)
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj)(Tj - Oj); II compute the error
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for each unit j in the hidden layers, from the last to the first hidden layer
(11)
(12)
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) YJ< Errk wjk', II compute the error with respect to
the next higher layer, k
(13)
for each weight w,y in network {
(14)
Aw,y = (1) Errj 0,; // weight increment
(15)
w,y = w,y + Aw,y-; } // weight update
(16)
for each bias Oj in network {
(17)
AOj = (1) Errj; // bias increment
(18)
Oj = Oj + AOj; } // bias update
(19) }}
Figure 23: Back-propagation Algorithm.

Each step of the Back-propagation algorithm (Han and Kamber 2005) is briefly described below:

Initialize the weights:
The weights in the network are initialized to small random numbers ranging from - 1.0 to 1.0.
Each unit has a bias associated with it. The biases are similarly initialized to small random
numbers.
Each training sample, X, is processed by the following steps.

Propagate the inputs forward:
In this step, the net input and output of each unit in the hidden and output layers are computed.
First, the training sample is fed to the input layer of the network. Note that for unity in the
input layer, its output is equal to its input, that is Oj = Ij for input unity. The net input to each
unit in the hidden layer and output layers is computed as a linear combination of its inputs. A
hidden layer or output layer unit is shown in figure 29. The inputs to the unit are the outputs of
the units connected to it in the previous layer. To compute the net input to the unit, each input
connected to the unit is multiplied by its corresponding weight, and this is summed. Given a
unity in a hidden or output layer, the net input, Ij, to unity is:
Ij = liWjOi

+ 0J
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where wy is the weight of the connection from unit I in the previous layer to unit j ; Ot is the
output of unit i from the previous layer; and #, is the bias of the unit. The bias acts as a
threshold in that it serves to vary the activity of the unit.
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Figure 24: Neural Network Structure

In above figure 24, a hidden or output layer unity: The inputs to unity are outputs from the
previous layer. These are multiplied by their corresponding weights in order to form a
weighted sum, which is added to the bias associated with unity. A nonlinear activation function
is applied to the net input.
Each unit in the hidden and output layers takes its net input and then applies an activation
function to it. The function symbolizes the activation of the neuron represented by the unit. The
following sigmoid function (Han and Kamber 2005) is used. Given the net input Ij to unity, then
Oj, the output of the unity, is composed as
Oi = l/l

+ e'1J

This sigmoid function is non-linear and differentiable, allowing the back-propagation
algorithm to model classification problems that are linearly inseparable.
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Back Propagate the Error:
The error is propagated backwards by updating the weights and biases to reflact the error of the
network's prediction. For a unity in the output layer, the error Err/ is computed by the
following:
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj)
Where Oj is the actual output of unity, and 7} is the true output, based on the known class label
of the given training sample.

To compute the error of a hidden layer unit j , the weighted sum of the errors of the units
connected to unit j in the next layer are considered. The error of a hidden layer unit j is as
follows:
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) X* Errk wjk
where w,* is the weight of the connection from unity to a unit k in the next higher layer, and
Errk is the error of unit k.
The weights and biases are updated to reflect the propagated errors. Weights are updated by the
following equations, where Aw,y is the change in w,y:
Av/y = 0)ErrJOl
Wy = W,y + AWy

The variable / is the learning rate, a constant typically having a value between 0.0 and 1.0.
Backpropagation learns using a method of gradient decent to search for a set of weights that
can model the given classification problem so as to minimize the mean squared distance
between the network's class prediction and the actual class label of the samples. The learning
rate helps to avoid getting stuck at a local minimum in decision space and encourages finding
the global minimum. If the learning rate is too small, then learning will occur at a very slow
pace. If the learning rate is too large, then oscillation between inadequate solutions may occur.
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A rule of thumb is to set learning rate to 1/t, where t is the number of iterations through the
training set so far.
Biases are updated by the following equation, where AQj is the change in bias 6f.
A6j=(\)Errj
0J=9J+A8J

Note that here we are updating the weights and biases after presentation of each sample. This is
referred to as case updating. Alternatively, the weight and bias increments could be
accumulated in variables, so that the weights and biases are updated after all of the samples in
the training set have been presented. This later strategy is called epoch updating, where one
iteration through the training set is an epoch. In theory, the mathematical derivation of backpropagation employs epoch updating, but case updating is more common since it tends to yield
more accurate results.
Terminating Condition:
Training stops when
•

All Aw,y in the previous epoch were so small as to be below some specified

threshold, or
•

The percentage of samples misclassified in the previous epoch is below some

threshold, or
•

A pre-specified number of epochs has expired.
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2.3.1.3.

Example for Learning by Back-propagation Algorithm:

Figure 25 shows a multilayer feed-forward neural network. Let the learning rate be 0.9. The
initial weights and bias values of the network are given in table 11, table 12 and table 13, along
with first training sample, X = (1, 0, 1), whose class label is 1.
Xi

x2

X3

Figure 25: An example of a multilayer Neural Network
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Table 11: Initial Input

W14

H>I5

*>24

W25

W34

W35

W46

WS6

0.2

-0.3

0.4

0.1

-0.5

0.2

-0.3

-0.2

Table 12: Initial weights

04

-0.4

0s
0.2

06

0.1

Table 13: Initial bias values
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The net input and output calculations using following two equations are showed in table 14:

Oi = l/l

+e'lJ

Unit/
4
5
6

Net input, lt
Output, Oj
1/(1+e u/ ) = 0.332
0.2 + 0 - 0.5 - 0.4 = -0.7
-0.3 + 0 + 0.2 + 0.2 = 0.1
1/(1 + e~ul) = 0.525
(-0.3) (0.332) - (0.2)(0.525) + 0.1 = -0.105 1/(1 + e0105) = 0.474
Table 14: The net input and output calculations

Calculation for the error at each node using following two equations are showed in table 15:
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj)
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) X* Errk wjk

Unity
6
5
4

Err,
(0.474) (1 -0.474) (1 -0.474) = 0.1311
(0.525) (1 - 0.525) (0.1311) (-0.2) = - 0.0065
(0.332) (1 - 0.332) (0.1311) (-0.3) = - 0.0087
Table 15: Error calculation for each node

Calculation for Weight updating by using following two equations are showed in table 16:
Awy = (1) Errj 0{
W y = W y + AWy

Weights
w46
W56
W14
WIS
W24
W25
W34
W35

New Value
-0.3 + (0.9)(0.1311)(0.332) = -0.261
-0.2 + (0.9)(0.1311)(0.525) = -0.138
0.2 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(l) = 0.192
-0.3 + (0.9)(-0.0065)(1) = -0.306
0.4 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(0) = 0.4
0.1+(0.9)(-0.0065)(0) = 0.1
-0.5 + (0.9)(-0.0087)(l) = -0.508
0.2+ (0.9)(-0.0065)(l) = 0.194
Table 16: Calculation for Weight updating
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Calculation for Bias updating by using following two equations are showed in table 17:

Bias
06
05
04

New Values
0.1 + (0.9)(0.1311) = 0.218
0.2 + (0.9)(-0.0065) = 0.194
-0.4 + (0.9X-0.0087) = -0.408
Table 17: Calculation for Bias updating

2.3.2. N9DS Using Neural Network:
A Wireless Intrusion Detection Method Based on Dynamic Growing
Neural Network
In this research paper (Liu et al. 2006), the authors presented an intrusion detection method
based on Dynamic Growing Neural Network (DGNN) for wireless networking. The main
character of the method is that it is an anomaly detection method and can learn the normal
behavior. DGNN is based on the Hebbian learning rule and adds new neurons under certain
conditions. When DGNN performs supervised learning, resonance will happen if the winner
can't match the training example; this rule combines the Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART)
(Grossberg 1996) neural network and Winner-Tale-All (WTA) learning algorithm. When
DGNN performs unsupervised learning, post-prune is carried out to prevent overfitting the
training data just like decision tree learning. To improve wireless intrusion detection accuracy,
we use an artificial neural network to perform anomaly detection. The following features are
introduced in their proposed system:

Feature Selection:
The basic premise for anomaly detection is that there is intrinsic and observable characteristic
of normal behaviour that is distinct from that of abnormal behaviour. Three main parts in
anomaly detection system are: feature selection, model of normal behaviour, and comparison.
Feature selection is a critical part in building normal behaviour model and performing
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comparison. In their proposed method, they selected and constructed features from MAC layer.
All 802.11 frames are composed by Preamble, PLCP Header, MAC Data, and CRC. Each
MAC Data frame consists of the following basic components: A MAC header, which
comprises frame control, duration, address, and sequence control information; A variable
length frame body, which contains information specific to the frame type; A frame check
sequence (FCS), which contains an IEEE 32-bit cyclic redundancy code (CRC). The frame
control field consists of control information, those four address fields indicate the BSSID,
source address, destination address, transmitting station address, and receiving station address.
All these information can be used to construct features.

Intrusion Detection Process
The behaviour of the network can be described as follows. At first, a training vector x is
presented to the network and each neuron receives this sample. Then the dissimilarity measure
between x and each synaptic weight will be computed. After that, the competitive function will
choose the winner neuron and compute the penalizing rate of other neurons. Last, the learning
rule part gets the result of competitive and updates the synaptic weights. The output is the
winner neuron, which represents a cluster. The summary of the operation is as follows:

StepO: Initialize learning rate parameter fi, penalizing rate parameter fi, the threshold of
dissimilarity v;
Stepl: Get the first input x and set wo = x as the initial weight;
Step2: If training is over go to step 6, else randomly takes a feature vector x from the feature
sample set X and computes the dissimilarity measure between x and each synaptic weight dt;
Step3: Decide the winner neuron j and tests tolerance: If (dj >= v) add a new neuron and sets
synaptic weight w = x , goto Step2;
Step4: Compute the penalizing rate y,;
Step5: Update the synaptic weight Wj, goto Setp2.
Step6: Use prune algorithm to prune the similar weights.

In supervised learning training vector x and neuron vector w includes the class identifier. If
their identifier is the same the learning will carry out. DGNN first studies the normal behaviour
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of WLAN to construct the normal feature set. When the neural network is stable, we can use it
to monitors the WLAN, If an intruder is trying to intrude the network, the intrusion detection
system can find it in real time and alarm immediately.

IWTA algorithm
The learning algorithm of DGNN is Improved Winner-Take-All (IWTA), which extends the
basic competitive learning algorithm - Winner-Tale-All (WTA). The basic idea of IWTA is not
only the winner is rewarded as in WTA but also all the losers are penalized in different rate.
There are some similarities between IWTA and RPCL (Nair et al. 2003). The principle
underlying RPCL is that in each iteration, the cluster center for the winner's neuron is
accentuated (rewarded) where at the weight for the second winner, or the rival, is attenuated
(penalized), and the remaining neurons are unaffected. IWTA is similar to LTCL (Nair et al.
2003) too, but in IWTA the penalized rate is based on the dissimilarity level.
The IWTA is summarized as follows:
i.

Use the following equation to measure to measure the dissimilarity between input

vector X and weight vector w-,, / = 1,...., n , n is the number of neurons;

d, =«/{x,w.) =
ii.

f i

Arrange the neurons according to dt from small to big and the smallest is the winner.

Determine the rewarding neuron and penalizing rate of other neurons as
1,

tfaewitMiier

•/#—,

others

where fi is the penalizing rate parameter, v is the threshold of dissimilarity.

iii.

If the winner's dissimilarity measure d < v, then update the synaptic weight by learning

rule as
W , ( H l ) = W,(f)H (i\yit-\ i M n l ) -

flW^l

where ji > 0 is the learning rate parameter, i indicates / th neuron. When the neuron is active
y = 1, // = // *V[ we get
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Else add a new neuron and set the synaptic weight w = x.
Post-prune algorithm
Neural network may also bring the overfitting problem. In decision tree learning, it uses postprune method to prevent overfitting. DGNN also performs the post-prune to overcome this
problem. The prune strategy based on the distance threshold and if two weights are too similar
they will be substituted by a new weight. The new weight is calculated as
Wnew = (W0id, X U - W0ld2 X t2) / (ti - t2)

where tj is the training times of W0m, t2 is the training times of W0td2
The prune algorithm is shown below:
StepO: If old weights meet (oldW) is null then algorithm is over
else go on;
Stepl: calculate the distance between the first weight (fw) and the other weights;
Step2: find the weight (sw) who is the most similar to fw;
Step3: if the distance between sw and fw is bigger than prune threshold then delete fw from
old Wand add fw into new weights meet (newW) go to step 0;
else go on;
Step4: get/vv's training times value (ft) and sw's training times value (st);
Step5: calculate the new weight (raw) andraw'straining times value (nt),
nw=(fw *ft + sw* st)l(ft+st),
nt=ft + st,
Step6: delete fw and sw from oldW, and add nw into newW, go to step 0.

In the simulation the authors first trained DGNN using the benchmark which contains 600
examples of control charts synthetically generated by the process in Alcock and Manolopoulos
(1999). There are six different classes of control charts: Normal, Cyclic, Increasing trend,
Decreasing trend, Upward shift, and Downward shift. The training result is show in Table 18.
In the dataset the classes are organized as follows: 1-100 are Normal, 101-200 are Cyclic, 201300 are Increasing trend, 301-400 are Decreasing trend, 401-500 Upward shift, and 501-600
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are Downward shift. After training they have used each class data to test which weight more
similar it. It is found that DGNN can perfectly predicate Normal/Cyclic classes. But it is often
confused by Decreasing trend/Downward shift and Increasing trend/ Upward shift classes.
To solve this problem they used the post-prune algorithm to cluster the similar weights which
have been gotten when distance threshold is 35. When the prune threshold is 40, the prune
result is shown in Table 19 After 7 epochs prune, all the 275 weights have been clustered to 33
weights.
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Table 18: DGNN Training Result
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Table 19: Prune Result

The Normal class has been clustered to No.l weight and it can perfectly predicate Normal data.
The results show that Decreasing trend and Increasing trend all clustered to two weights, other
weights have cluster to Downward shift and Upward shift. Through analyze and test the
weights it can be found that the reason to confuse Decreasing trend/Downward shift and
Increasing trend/ Upward shift is two weights which have been shown with dotted lines in the
figures. So if we delete those two weights the neural network can perfectly predict synthetic
control chart time series.

In this experiment, the authors have evaluated their proposed method. They first train the
neural network with different normal features, then use the stable neural network to monitor
the system where some abnormal behaviours are happening under the same environment. They
have tested the false alarm rate under different learning and detection conditions. MAC
address, IP address, and some control information were taken out from packet to construct
features of WLAN. In detection process, one PC of room A carried out ping death attack to the
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WLAN and a desktop PC with TL-WN650G/PCI sniffs the WLAN. In their experiment they
found that DGNN can detect those attacks. After 1.5xl04 times training, the neural network
could learn the normal behaviour of this WLAN and the error rate was about 15%.

The main problem of the method is that it usually falsely alarm new normal adding mobile
client as intruder, and some abnormal behavior of added station cannot be found. Some famous
attacks such as RTS/CTS based DoS cannot be prevented by this method. So their plan was to
extend their work by adding some rule-based expert system and response methods to improve
detection accuracy.
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3.

Proposed System for Wireless Intrusion Detection:

The timely and accurate detection of computer and network system intrusions has always been
an elusive goal for system administrators and information security researchers. The individual
creativity of attackers, the wide range of computer hardware and operating systems, and the
ever changing nature of the overall threat to target systems have contributed to the difficulty in
effectively identifying intrusions. A single intrusion of a computer network can result in the
loss or unauthorized utilization or modification of large amounts of data and cause users to
question the reliability of all of the information on the network.

The constantly changing nature of network attacks requires a flexible defensive system that is
capable of analyzing the enormous amount of network traffic in a manner which is less
structured than rule-based systems. A neural network-based misuse detection system could
potentially address many of the intrusions that are found in rule-based systems. Rule-based
systems suffer from an inability to detect attacks scenarios that may occur over an extended
period of time and also lack flexibility in the rule-to-audit record representation (Cannady
2000). Slight variations in an attack sequence can affect the activity-rule comparison to a
degree that the intrusion is not detected by the intrusion detection mechanism. A neural
network conducts an analysis of the data and provides a probability estimate that the data
matches the characteristics which it has been trained to recognize. Therefore, we have used
Neural Network technique in our proposed wireless network intrusion detection system.

The main advantages of the artificial neural networks include the ability of faster information
processing, the ability of classification, the ability of learning and self-organization. By virtue
of these abilities of the artificial neural networks, the network intrusion detection system can
analyze the network stream real time and detect whether there exist intrusions or not (Jing et al.
2004).

A neural network conducts an analysis of the information and provides a probability estimate
that the data matches the characteristics which it has been trained to recognize. While the
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probability of a match determined by a neural network can be almost 100%, though the
accuracy of its decisions relies totally on the experience the system gains from training period.

3.1. Overview of the Proposed System - NeuDetect:
To be effective Intrusion Detection System for wireless sensor network, it should always
monitor the airwaves to recognize and prevent attacks before the attacker authenticates to
Access Point (AP). Our wireless LAN will make use of stream of sensor data from a remote
sensor IDS that continuously monitors the wireless packets and extracts information like
source and destination MAC address, the sequence number and AP the wireless station is
trying to connect to, by reading 802.11b frames. Then the extracted data will be analyzed and
pre-processed to serve as input to our Neural Network based anomaly detection module, where
we have used the Back-Propagation algorithm for finding anomalies. From the figure 26 below
we can see that our proposed wireless intrusion detection system based on the artificial neural
networks includes several modules, now we will introduce briefly each module separately.

Data Collection
Module

Sensor
>

Sensor

Data Processor
Module

Detection
Module

Extracts selected
attribute values
from wireless
sensor log by
Commview for
WiFi and outputs
csv file

Detects
anomalous data
packets by
using BackPropagation
Algorithm

i>

1

>
V

Decision
Module

f

1

Triggers Alert

>
I

Figure 26: Prototype Structure of the Proposed System

The NeuDetect algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1 in figure 27. The proposed model finds
the anomalous patterns after having training data by using Back-Propagation Neural Network
techniques.
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\Algorithm 1: (NeuDetect: Wireless IDS)
Algorithm NeuDetectO
Input: Wireless Data Packets (P), Sensors (S), Access Points (AP)
Output: Anomalous Packets (A), Alert
Begin
While (true)
(1)
Capture wireless packets from AP using sensors (S)
(2)
Extract connection packets (P)from sensors S with
Commview for WiFi software and save as .csvfile
(3)
Call Back-Propagation Algorithm insert
.csvfile records as input and output anomalous
records (A)
(4)
Triggers alerts.
End

Figure 27: Algorithm 1 - NeuDetect Model

3.2.1. Data Collection Module:
This module monitors network stream real time and capture wireless data packets to serve as
the data source of the NIDS. Our Packet Capture module contains the proprietary Network
Chemistry wireless hardware sensors (Network Chemistry 2006). The goal of this module is to
capture wireless network packets successfully from a selected Access Point (AP) and log them
into the database. Then the Feature Extractor module converts the raw data to readable format
with help of CommView (CommView for WiFi 2007) for WiFi software and outputs a csv file
(csv stands for Comma Seperated Values where attributes values are simple text separated by
commas).

So, for the Data Collection and Data Processor module we have to perfectly install and
configure 1) Wireless Access Point (AP), 2) RF Sensors including both a sensor server and a
sensor client software, 3) CommView for WiFi software, 4) MS SQL Server database as
shown in figure 28.
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Figure 28: Data Collection and Data Processor Module

Clients connect to the wireless network through Access Point (AP) and our sensors are
configured and associated with the AP, so that, the sensor can capture all the packets sent by
the client to the AP. In this way, we ensure that all packets from clients that pass through our
network are captured by the sensor. Sensors receive and analyze all 802.11 packets, analyze the
data, and send processed data to the Server, where the information is stored. For the Sensors to
perform their function, we installed and configured RFprotect Server and Client software of
Network Chemistry Sensors.

The RFprotect Server analyzes, stores, and integrates data from Sensors. The Server comprises
the RFprotect Engine, a database of known stations, experts, location analysis, alerts, and
reported events. The Server consolidates and analyzes wireless traffic, generates alerts and
maintains a database for the RFprotect console users.

The Console (client) provides the information presentation and operator controls for RFprotect.
The Console is the main suite of tools for viewing and managing the information provided by
the RFprotect Server and Sensors, and provides views of wireless activity, security alerts, and
RF environmental analysis.

The minimum requirements for installing the Sensor software are as follows:
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•

Windows XP, 2000, 2003 or Linux operating system

•

2.4GHz or greater CPU

•

1GByte memory

Hardware configuration of our system for Sensor Server and Client Installation:
•

Windows XP Professional Operating System Service pack 2

•

Pentium 4 CPU 3.06 GHZ

•

1 GB RAM

•

150 GB of Hard disk

Sensor Software installation steps:
The software installation is easy. We first installed the server software before the client. With
the software CD inside the CDROM drive, we started the RFprotectServer and the installer
displays a Welcome screen dialog box. Select all the default and continue clicking "Next" until
completing the RFprotectServer setup wizard then click Finish and then proceed to creating the
database wizard. We also choose the default for the database creation which uses firebird. The
RFprotectClient installation is also easy. We selected all the default for this installation.

Configuring Sensors:
After installation we launch the RFprotectClient, as shown in figure 29, and then we enter the
password.
Network Chi'imslry PFprott'tl I'.un

RFprotect Console Login
Client/Server Edition
Version: 5.0.6

Connect f Advanced!
Cho«s« Ihe sawei to connect to from the Aop dawn Ifetor enter the
connection setfirtg?fore new; server.
Server

jlocalhost

"3

Usemartie JSYSDBA
Password

p-i
Conneet

Figure 29: RFProtect Login Window
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The screen in figure 30 will appear showing that no sensor has been added. To add a sensor,
we click on the Add sensor button, then the discover sensor window as shown in figure 31 is
open.
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Figure 30: Sensor Configuration Window

Figure 31: Discover Sensor Window

We double-click our Sensor that we want to configure. The dialog infigure32 appears.
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C
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192
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Figure 32: Sensor IP address Configuration

1. Click the Address tab.
2. Click Obtain an IP address automatically using DHCP to cause Sensors to use DHCP to get
their IP address, gateway, and domain.
3. Click Apply.
4. Configure the Server address for the Sensor by clicking the Server tab

Once a Sensor is added the Configuration window first appears with the unrecognized Sensor
displayed, shown in figure 33. The lock icon indicates that the sensor is not yet communicating
with the server. Clicking the check box will make the sensor to communicate with the server.
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Figure 33: Console window with unknown sensor

Once the sensor is configured to send data to the server, the sensor is displayed in the Console.
Figure 34 shows our sensor in a communication state.
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Figure 34: Console window with sensor
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Monitoring and capturing packets
Once the sensor is configured, it is able to detect all wireless networks around it as can be seen
in figure 35 below. Then we select the AP from which we want to capture the packets, we right
click on it and select external capture as shown in figure 36.

It is worth noting here that the Network chemistry RFprotect sensor is a capture device for
Packetyzer. Packetyzer is a packet capture program that is installed with the Network
Chemistry RFprotect software. Figure 36 shows Packetyzer has been used to capture packets in
WiFiMiner. The RFprotect is a signature-based Intrusion protection system for 802.1 la/b/g
wireless connections that is used to detect rogue devices, intrusion and DOS attacks. It is not
capable of detecting new or unknown attacks unless the signature of that attack is updated in
the RFprotect server.
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Figure 35: Console with access points and clients
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Figure 36: Captured packets using Packetyzer
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3.2.2. Data Processor Module:
This module extracts feature vector from the network stream and submits the feature vector to
the Back-Propagation (BP) model. Here the feature vector should serve for the description of
the network stream. Wireless Network stream itself is not suitable directly as the input of the
BP Classifier, so it is necessary to extract some features from the network stream. Feature
selection and extraction is one of the pivotal problems in implementing the intrusion detection
system. The core of anomaly detection in wireless network lies in selecting features that have
enough weight to detect intrusions. For example, attackers look for open ports as a passage
through which to enter the network and launch their attacks. It means that features like Ports
(source and destination), MAC address (source and destination), Total number of packets and
the size of the packet sent in a certain time interval, will play a vital role in detecting the
attacks. The features extracted from the wireless network stream forms a feature vector which
serves for the description of the packet. After a detailed study of network attacks we have
selected the following feature/ attributes to form the feature vector that we hope will be able to
detect wireless attacks.

Feature/ Attribute

Definition

ESSID

The Access Point (AP) Name

SrcMAC

Source MAC Address

destMAC

Destination MAC Address

SrcIP

The source IP address

destIP

The destination IP address

Packet Size

The number of bytes

Time

Time stamp

srcPort

Source Port no

destPort

Destination Port no

. Channel

Channel Number
Table 20: Wireless Packet Measurement Attributes
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We have used a very powerful tool, Commview for WiFi, in our data processor module to
analyze and extract the features for 802.11 a/b/g/n captured wireless packets. With Commview
for WiFi, we can easily select which features/ attributes are to be exported into the csv file. A
sample of csv file is shown in following figure 37.
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Figure 37: Sample preprocessed csv file output by Commview for WiFi

We have used an ETL tool called MS SQL Server Information Services (SSIS) to load from
.cvs file into MS SQL Server database.

3.2.3. Detection Module:
The function of this module is to analyze the network stream and to draw a conclusion whether
normal or anomalous. To analyze the network stream we have used Back-Propagation (BP)
technique, the most widely used neural network technique, which has made a good figure in
the field of Pattern Recognition. In fact, the problem to be solved by the intrusion detection
system is to differentiate "Bad Packets" from "Good Packets" in the network stream. In this
sense, "Intrusion Detection" can be understood as "Pattern Recognition" to some extent (Jing et
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al. 2004). From this point of view, we select Back-Propagation model in the design of the
NIDS prototype based on the artificial neural networks. There are several conditions which
should be considered in the design of the detection module by using Back-Propagation
technique:

• The number of hidden layers: It is rare to have more than two hidden layers in the neural
network structure. For general applications one hidden layer is enough. That's why in the 3layer Neural Network, we have set one hidden layer in-between input and output layer.

• The dimension of the input layer and the output layer. Generally speaking, the dimension of
the input layer is the number of the features selected, and the dimension of the output layer is
the number of outputs that can be classified by the Detection Module. We have selected 10
attributes from the feature vector as input layer and 1 attribute as output layer.

• The dimension of the hidden layer. In contrast with the input layer and the output layer, the
dimension of the hidden layer is difficult to determine. There is no deterministic theory that
can be applied on this problem. The book (Masters 2006) presented a formula which we have
used to determine the dimension of the hidden layer. The formula is as follows:

Hidden Layer = Vmn = VlxlO = VlO = 3.16
Where, m = dimension of output layer and n = dimension of input layer.
Therefore, we have taken 3 attributes in the hidden layer for our BP Neural Network.
• The activation function. In general, the function
/f*;=l/(l+exp(-x))
can be used in the Detection Module.

• Initialization of the weight and the threshold. The weight of different neural units and the
threshold will be set to a small random number from -1 to 1. By doing so, the convergence of
the BP network can be ensured.
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After taking these conditions into account carefully, we have designed a prototype Neural
Network for our proposed system as follows in figure 38. We have drawn the following figure
with 6 inputs to avoid a clumsy figure and also to do step by step demonstration of manual
calculation for the training algorithm.

Figure 38: Neural Network for Proposed System with 10 inputs, 1 outputs and 3 dimensional 1 hidden layer

As we know, the artificial neural networks can work effectively only when it has been trained
correctly. So, the first step of the Detection Module is training. That is to say, given a set of
intrusion samples, according to the BP algorithm, the Detection Module will learn what is
normal, what is abnormal, and what an intrusion is. When the training target has been reached,
the training procedure finished, and the Detection Module has memorized the knowledge on
how to analyze and determine whether an intrusion event happens or not. Then the trained
Detection Module can be used to analyze the network stream captured by the data collection
module. The training algorithm that we have used in our proposed system is as follows in
figure 39:
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Algorithm 2. (Training Algorithm)
Training Algorithm 0
Input: Processed Data - Featured Vector with 6 Attributes (V)
Output: Anomalous Packets (A), Normal Packets (N)
Begin
1.
Set all weights to random values ranging from -1.0 to +1.0
2.
Set an input pattern to the neurons of the net's input layer
3.
Activate each neuron of the following layer:
Multiply the weight values of the connections leading to this
neuron with the output values of the preceding neurons
Add up these values
Pass the result to an activation function, which computes the
output value of this neuron
Repeat this until the output layer is reached
4.
Compare the calculated output pattern to the desired target pattern and
compute an error value
5.
Change all weight values of each weight matrix using the formula:
- weight(old) + learning rate * output error * output(neurons i) *
output(neurons i+1) * ( 1 - output(neurons i+1) )
6.
Go to step 2
7.
The algorithm ends, if all output patterns match their target patterns
End

Figure 39: Learning Algorithm

Now we are describing how the training process will be running with the following example:
We will follow our neural network structure as in figure 43. We have selected six input
variables from the feature vector as following table 21. We have converted all values of the
feature vectors into numeric values. To simplify calculation we divide each value by its
decimal numbers and take up to precision level 3.

SrcMAC

= 00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 = 0014D13A71E4 = 89409614308
= 89409614308 /10000000000 = 0.89409614308
= 0.894

destMAC

= 00:1F:3A:57:5A:49 = 001F3A575A49 = 134122789449
= 0.134
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ESSID

= ZILLUR - 907376768582
= 0.907

Xj

SrcMAC
89409614308

x2
destMAC
134122789449

X3

X4

srcPort
80

destPort
52580

x2
0.134

Xi

X4

0.80

0.525

X]

0.894

x5
Packet Size
110

x6
ESSID
907376768582

x6
0.907

x5
0.11

Table 21: Initial Input

Then we set all weights and biases values to random values ranging from -1.0 to +1.0.
W/7

wis

0.2

-0.3

w19
0.4

W38

-0.2

w39
0.1

w47
-0.2

w59
-0.2

w67
0.5

W27

*V28

W29

W37

0.1

-0.5

0.2

-0.3

w48
0.3

W49

-0.1

w57
-0.4

W68

n>69

W710

wsio

W910

-0.3

-0.5

0.2

0.4

-0.4

W>5S

0.3

Table 22: Initial weights

07

-0.4

6>,
0.2

09

O10

0.5

0.3

Table 23: Initial bias values

Now we will calculate Net Inputs to Hidden Layer using the following equation:
Ij = S, wu Ot + 6j
where, Ij is net input for unity,
Wjj is the weight of the connection from unit / in the previous layer to unity,
Oj is the output of unit i from the previous layer, and
9j is the bias of the unity.
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h

= 0.894 x 0.2+ 0.134 x 0.1 + 0.80 x (-0.3) + 0.525 x (-0.2) + 0.11 x (-0.4) + 0.907 x 0.5
+ (-0.4)
= 0.1788 + 0.0134 - 0.24 - 0.105 - 0.044 + 0.4535 - 0.4 = 0.6457 - 0.789
= -0.1433

Ig

= 0.894 x (-0.3) + 0.134 x (-0.5) + 0.80 x (-0.2) + 0.525 x 0.3 + 0.11 x 0.3 + 0.907 x (0.3) + 0.2
= - 0.2682 - 0.067 - 0.16 + 0.2575 + 0.033 - 0.2721 + 0.2 = - 0.7673 + 0.4905
= - 0.2768

I9

= 0.894 x 0.4 + 0.134 x 0.2 + 0.80 x 0.1 + 0.525 x (-0.1) + 0.11 x (-0.2) + 0.907 x (-0.5)
+ 0.5
= 0.3576 + 0.0268 + 0.08 - 0.0525 - 0.022 - 0.4535 + 0.5 = 0.9644 - 0.528
= 0.4364

Output for hidden layer, O,• = 1 / (1 + e'!J)
07

= 1 / (1 + e 01433 ) = 1 / (1 + 1.154076) = 1 / 2.154076 = 0.464236

08

= 1 / (1 + e 02768 ) = 1 / (1 + 1.318903) = 1 / 2.318903 = 0.431238

09

= 1 / (1 + e" ° 4364) = 1 / (1 + 0.646359) =1/1.646359 = 0.6074

Net Input for output layer, Ij = £, wy Ov + 0j
I10

= 0.4642 x 0.2 + 0.4013 x 0.4 + 0.2689 x (- 0.4) + 0.3
= 0.1025 + 0.1605 - 0.1076 + 0.3 = 0.563 - 0.1076
= 0.4554

Output for output layer, 0, = 1 / (1 + e 'lj)
do

= 1 / (1 + e -°-4554) = 1 / (1 + 0.634194) = 1 /1.634194 = 0.6119

The error is propagated backwards by updating the weights and biases to reflect the error of the
network's predictions. The error is calculated by the following equation for Output Layers:
Errj=Oj(l-Oj)(Tj-Oj)
Where Oj is the actual output of unit j , and Tj is the true output, based on the known class level
of the given training sample. Here the class level that we consider is 1.
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Err,o

= 0.6119x (1- 0.6119) x (1- 0.6119) = 0.6119 x 0.3881 x 0.3881 = 0.0921

The Error for hidden layer units are calculated using following equations:
Errj = Oj (1 - Oj) £* Errk wjk
Err9

= 0.6074 x (1 - 0.6074) x (0. 0921 x (-0.4))
= 0.2689 x 0.3926 x (- 0.0458)
= - 0.0038

Err8

= 0.4312 x (1 - 0.4312) x (0.0921 x 0.4)
= 0.4312x0.5688x0.0368
= 0.0090

Err7

= 0.4642 x (1 - 0.4642) x (0.0921 x 0.2)
= 0.4642x0.5358x0.0184
= 0.0045

The weights and biases are updated to reflect propagated errors. Weights are updated by the
following equation:
wij = Wjj + (1) En} Oj
Where, / is learning rate. We consider here, / = 0.9.
W e i g h t updating:
W 7 10
W810
W910
W17
Wi8
W,9

W27
W28
W29

W37
W38
W39

= Wy+ (1) Errj Oi =
= w^ + (1) Errj Oj =
= WiJ + ( l ) E r r j O i =

0.2 + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.4642) = 0.2384
0.4 + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.4312) = 0.4357
(-0.4) + (0.9)(0.0921)(0.6074) = - 0.3496

= w ^ + (1) Errj Oi =
= w ^ + (1) Errj Oj =
= Wij + ( l ) E r r j O i =

0.2 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.894) = 0.2036
-0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.894) = - 0.2927
0.4 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.894) = 0.3964

= Wij + ( l ) E r r j O i =
= Wy + (1) Errj Oi =
= wy + (1) Errj Oj =

0.1 + (0.9X0.0045X0.134) = 0.1005
-0.5 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.134) = - 0.4889
0.2 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.134) = 0.1995

= w,j + ( l ) E r r j O i =
= wij + ( l ) E n j O i =
= Wij + ( l ) E r r j O i =

-0.3 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.80) = - 0.2967
-0.2 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.80) = - 0.1935
0.1 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.80) = 0.0972
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W47
W48
W49

=

W57
w58
w59

= Wij + (1) En-j O = -0.4 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.11) = - 0.3995
= Wjj + (1) En-j O = 0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.11) = 0.3008
= Wy + (1) Errj O = -0.2 + (0.9)(- 0.0038X0.11) = - 0.2003

W67
w68
w69

= Wjj + (1) ElTj O = 0.5 + (0.9X0.0045X0.907) = 0.5036
= Wy + (1) En-j O = -0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.907) = - 0.2926
= w,j + (1) En-j O - -0.5 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.907) = - 0.5031

Wjj + (1) ElTj O = -0.2 + (0.9)(0.0045)(0.525) = - 0.1978
= Wjj + (1) ElTj O = 0.3 + (0.9)(0.0090)(0.525) = 0.3042
=
Wjj + (1) ElTj O = -0.1 + (0.9)(- 0.0038)(0.525) = - 0.1017

N o w , the biases are updated b y the following equations:

ej = ej + 0)Errj

Bias updating:
810

= 6j + (1) En-j = 0.3 + (0.9)(0.6119) = 0.8507

e9

- 6j + (1) En-j = 0.5 + (0.9)(- 0.6074) = - 0.0466

08

= 9j + (1) En-j = 0.2 + (0.9)(0.4312) = 0.5880

07

= 9j + (1) En-j = - 0.4 + (0.9)(0.4642) = 0.0177

Thus the first input pattern had been propagated through the net by updating the weights and
bias. The same procedure is used for the next input pattern, but then with the changed weight
values. After the backward propagation of the pattern, one learning step is complete and the
output error can be calculated by adding up the squared output errors of each pattern. By
performing this procedure repeatedly, this error value gets smaller and smaller. The algorithm
is successfully finished, if the error is zero (perfect) or approximately zero.

The equation for calculating the root mean square error for a series of n values of x is as
follows:
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Xrms = V (Xl2 + X2 + ... + X„2) /H

We got the root mean square error for training data, xrms = 0.0058, which is matched very
closely with the desired root mean square (RMS) error of 0.0.

An anomaly score is assigned to each packet calculating the difference between the output
error and threshold. If the anomaly score is positive then the relevant wireless packet will be
flagged as "Anomalous" and set an attack number to it for future comparison with incoming
packets. If the anomaly score is zero or close to zero will be flagged as "Unknown" packet and
it will send back to training process. Finally if the anomaly score is negative then the packet is
flagged as "Normal". Then, these anomalous data packets are stored into the intrusion database
and an attack number is assigned to all identified anomalous packets. The system will send
back the "Unknown" packet to reevaluate into the training process. This reevaluating process
will dynamically enhance the intrusion database of our proposed system.

3.2.4. Decision Module:
When detecting an intrusion, this module will send an alert message to the security
administrator. After scrutinizing the data stream from Detection Module whether it is normal
or anomalous, this module will make decision on the anomalous packets whether it is a known
attack or unknown or normal. This module will estimate that the network stream is dangerous,
and the network stream is the same or very similar with one of the attack type by matching
with intrusion database which the Detection Module has been trained, then it will draw a
conclusion that the network stream being detected can be classified into one attack type with
the label "Attack". We have used the following algorithm in our decision module, figure 39.
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Algorithm 3: (Decision Algorithm)
Algorithm DecisionO
Input: Anomaly Score (X), Attack Number (N)
Output: Normal (M), Known Attack (K), Unknown Attack (U)
Begin
If positive anomaly score
Level as Anomalous and match with attack database
and trigger alert
Else if negative anomaly score
Skip it as Normal
Else if zero or close to zero
Level as Unknown Attack
And send back to training process to reevaluate
End
Figure 39: Algorithm 3 - Decision Module

When the Detection Module estimates that the network stream is Anomalous and decision
module can not match with any known "Attack", but the threshold of the Detection Module has
been reached, then this module will draw the conclusion that the network stream being detected
is "Unknown". Here the "Unknown" virtually represents a new attack type which the Detection
Module has not been trained to identify. The "Unknown" examples then will be added to the
Training Samples of the BP Model, and after training with the "Unknown" examples, the
Detection Module will have the ability to identify it accurately. After such a process, the
"Unknown" becomes some known "Attack", which implies that the ability of the BP Model
can be enhanced dynamically.
All of these modules together constitute the NeoDetect prototype system based on the artificial
neural networks, and the function of each module has been introduced briefly.

85

4.

Experiments and Result Analysis:

We have developed a prototype system to implement our proposed system NeuDetect which
includes the algorithms and techniques described in section 3. We have used the programming
language C#, MS SQL Server database engine and SQL Server Information Services (SSIS) to
implement this. We also have used hardware sensor to capture wireless connection records
before they reach the access point, then these captured records are preprocessed by Commview
for NeuDetect software. The tool Commview outputs the captured records as csv file. Then this
preprocessed csv file send to the Detection Module to flag anomalous connection packets.

The main objective of this experiment is to prove that our proposed system NeuDetect is
capable of detecting more types of wireless attacks than other system at a lower cost. We
compared our system with Snort-Wireless (Air Snort 2007), which is the only open source
wireless IDS, WiFi Miner (Ezeife and Rahman 2008) and Sensor-Based Online Clustering
Approach for Wireless Intrusion Detection - WIDCA (Ezeife and Ejelike 2008). Due to the
unavailability of labeled wireless data as normal or anomaly, we crafted our own packets to
train and test the system.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 describes our test bed setup, section
4.2 describes how we crafted the different types of attack packets for training and 4.3 describes
how we tested our system and section 4.4 describes the test analysis of the results after
comparing with other systems.

4.1.

Test Bed Setup:

The test bed of our proposed system consists of three computers (PC-1, PC-2, and PC-3), one
Proprietary wireless sensor (Network Chemistry), and one access point (AP). The network is
setup as figure 40. We installed Network Chemistry sensor and Commview for WiFi in PC-1
from where we scanned all Access Points in ranges and selected the AP for our wireless
network and started capturing packets from our Access Point. We created a wireless network
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with PC-2 and PC-3 where both were connected to AP. PC-2 is the attacker PC and PC-3 is the
victim PC.

Figure 40: Our Test Bed

The hardware configurations of these PCs are as below:
PC-1: Intel Pentium 4 1.87 GHz, 1.0 GB Ram, 60 GB Hard Drive
PC-2: Intel Pentium 4, 2.0 GHz, 2.0 GB Ram, 160 GB Hard Drive
PC-3: Intel Pentium 4, 2.2 GHz, 4.0 MB Ram, 250 GB Hard Drive

4.2. Wireless Attacks Crafted for Training
As we know it is hard to get wireless training sample data comprised with wireless attacks and
normal data. Therefore, we have crafted following attacks using different available free tools
and we captured these wireless attacks using sensors and then these captured records are
preprocessed by Commview. Then Commview outputs the captured packets as csv file.
Similarly we have preprocessed some normal innocent wireless packets by Commview after
capturing with the sensor.
•

WEP Cracking Attack
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•

De-authentication Attack

•

Disassociation Attack

•

ARP Poisoning Attack

•

SYN Flood and UDP Flood Attacks

•

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

At first we have generated some innocentVnormal packets between PC-2 and PC-3 in figure 40.
These packets were generated as a result of some innocent web browsing. Within 10 minutes
time window we have captured about 20,000 packets. The following figure 41 shows that we
captured these packets with the Network Chemistry sensor. Then we preprocessed these data
with Commview for NeuDetect software.
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Figure 41: Innocent wireless packets captured for training our system

After that we collected 2100 anomalous packets (WEP Cracking attacks, De-authentication
attacks, Disassociation attacks, ARP Poisoning attacks, SYN Flood attacks, UDP Flood attacks
and Man-in-the-Middle attacks - about 300 packets from each type) and mixed these 2100
anomalous packets with 20,000 innocent packets and input these total combined 22,100 dataset
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for training into the Detection Module of our proposed system where we implement the BackPropagation algorithm.

In the rest of the section we will discuss about crafting these attack packets.

Crafting Attack Packets for Training:
To craft attacks, we have used BackTrack network security suite (BackTrack 2007).
BackTrack is a Linux live distribution focused on penetration testing tools as a Live CD.
Currently BackTrack consists of more than 300 different up-to-date security tools which are
logically structured according to the work flow of security professional. We have used this
BackTrack tool for crafting few wireless attacks for the training data of our system and also for
testing our system.

WEP Cracking Attack
At first we stared the tools Kismet to monitor wireless traffic by clicking on the start key and
browsing to Backtrack->Wireless Tools -> Analyzers ->Kismet. We use Kismet to find the
bssid, essid, channel number of the Access Points (AP) and also type of encryption (WEP) that
we will be accessing. We select the AP we want to access, then we copy and paste the
broadcast name (ESSID), MAC address (BSSID) and channel number of the selected AP into a
text editor. Here, the Access Point is NeuDetect for our experiments.

Then we open up a new terminal window and start the tool Airodump, 802.11 packet capture
tool, so we can collect ARP replies from the target AP.

We captured some packets from our Access Point (NeuDetect) and from there we spoofed a
valid client's MAC address. Then we started BackTrack security tool and using the Aireplay
[52] utility we sent authentication and association request to NeuDetect AP as in figure 42. The
following command we have used:

Aireplay-ng -1 0 -e NeuDetect -a 00:14:D1:3A: 71:E4 -h 00:0E:35:07:A7:FC ethO
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Here, -1 means attack mode, 0 means continuously, -e is the option for SSID of target AP, -a
denotes the target AP's MAC, -h denotes source MAC and ethO is the network card.

Then we started sending fake ARP packets to NeuDetect AP so that we can capture the replies
through Airodump. Once we have captured enough packets then we started Aircrack utility to
decrypt the WEP key as figure 43. In few minutes time interval Aircrack decrypted the WEP
key.
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The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks.
De-authentication Attack:
A host authenticates to a WEP protected AP there are six packets involved (Deckerd and
Hindarto 2006) in the authentication. Two of these packets can be used to crack the WEP key.
Below is a capture of a six packet authentication between the client, 00:14:6C:6C:AA:77, and
the AP, 00:OF:66:2B:8A:CF.
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Figure 44: Six Authentication Packets

1. Client sends Probe Request with ESSID to the broadcast address.
2. AP with matching ESSID responds indicating the AP's MAC address and other available
options.
3. Client acknowledges probe response.
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4. AP sends encrypted challenge text to client.
5. Client deciphers challenge text and responds with the challenge text encrypted using the
shared key.
6. The AP verifies that the challenge text is correct and responds indicating that authentication
was successful.
To craft attacks we are interested in capturing packet number four and five; the challenge text
exchange between the AP and client. Both of these packets are encrypted using the shared
WEP key and therefore can be used to crack the WEP key.

We use aireplay-ng to de-authenticate a host using the —deauth option. This attack will send a
spoofed deauthentication request as the AP to the client (Deckerd and Hindarto 2006). To
perform this attack we used the target's MAC address, option -c below and the target AP
BSSID, option - a below. Both of these can be gathered using Kismet.
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Figure 47: De-authentication attacks using Aireplay-ng

The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks.

Disassociation Attack:
Disassociation messages, however, are not as regular as application data. They must be
injected through the data link layer to convey management information employed in 802.11
standards. To craft disassociation attack we have used a tool called Air-jack which provides
direct utilities for sending association and de-authentication frames.

To craft attacks we have supplied correct arguments such as the interface, AP's MAC, victim's
MAC, and source's MAC (same as AP's MAC). The disassociation frames have sent to the
intended victim and cause it to disassociate with the access point.
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After sending disassociation packets using Air-jack we monitored kismet and found
disassociation happened as showed in figure 49. We also tried to ping the affected host and it
was not responding as showed in figure 50.

—
' »f.Tiinig?42
I WA»GiO"
x

',

i

*

'

-,

•
-

•

^

••

l.ocataotirree.0013A914B37B

>

t

i

-Wi C h
Pack
A Y 0O«
69
AY
O05 225TO
A O O U
1«MSIQ

i

\ t

ri

*

<*

>

A Y DOS

i i t n. i t i i i i - i

i

i

A4
A4

192.108.1
192.ias.1.

>

,

270

00 14 D l ->ft 7 1 : E ^

Figure 48: Disassociation showed in Kismet
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The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks.
ARP Poisoning Attack
To generate the attack first of all we have to search for a host on which we want to mount the
attack. We have used NMAP to get the list of hosts which are currently up in the network.
Once we get the IP addresses we can start crafting attack any one or all of the hosts with
another tool named ettercap.
The following command we have used in NMAP for searching host:
#nmap-sP 192.168.1.*
•h«lt - N D M
---append-output

Append t o , r a t h e r

than c l o b b e r s p e c i f i e d o u t p u t

files

- - s e n d - e t h / - - s e n d - i p : Send u s i n g raw e t h e r n e t frames o r IP packets
- - p r i v i l e g e d : Assume t h a t t h e user i s f u l l y p r i v i l e g e d
., - - u n p r i v i l e g e d : Assume t h e user l a c k s raw s o c k e t p r i v i l e g e s
-V: P r i n t v e r s i o n number
• -h P r i n t t h i s h e l p summary paqe.
EXAMPLES,
nmap - v -A scanme.nmap.org
nmap -.1 -sP 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 >V16 1 0 . Q . 0 . 0 / 8
' nmap -v - i R 10000 -PN -p 88
SEE THE ['IAN PAGE FOR'MANY MORE OPTIONS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND EXAMPLES
nmap -sP 192.168 l . t
' t i n g Nmap 4 . 2 0 C h t t p : / / i n s e c u r e . o r g ) a t 2 0 0 7 - 1 1 - 0 6 1 3 :
. 1 9 2 . 1 5 8 . 1 . 1 a p p e a r s t o be u p .
A d d r e s s : O O : 1 C : 1 0 : 9 E : 8 C : D 1 (Unknown)
: 1 9 2 . 1 5 8 . 1 . 1 0 0 a p p e a r s t o be u p .
: 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 0 1 a p p e a r s t o be u p .
Address: 00:13:02:3B:1A:8C ( I n t e l Corporate)
L 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 0 9 a p p e a r s t o be u p .
Address: 00:12:17:9A-:8C:D5
(Cisco-Linhsys)
f i n i s h e d : ' 2 5 b I P 'addresses ( 4 h o s t s up) scanned i n 4 8 . 4 5 0

se

Figure 50: NMAP Output

To craft a simple ARP Poisoning attack, on the attacking machine, first start the browser and
then use the following command:
#ettercap -T -Q -M arp:remote -i ethl /192.168.1.102/ // -P remote_browser
Where,
•

-T starts ettercap in text mode.
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•

-Q will make ettercap be superQuiet (not print raw packets in the terminal
window)

•

-M starts man in the middle mode, and

•

arp:remote is the type of poisoning, and remote is a parameter for MITM. These
options can be combined into one switch like -TQM.

•

ethl is the network interface used in the attacking machine.

•

192.168.1.102 is the IP address of the victim.

The above command will log all the URLs that the victim visits on the attacker's computer.
Also this will let a netscape-based browser (Mozilla, Firefox, Netscape etc) on the attacking
machine silently follow the web pages that a victim machine visits. The following figure 52
shows the screenshot of the output of the above command.

:S#siort ; Sdit:; MeW: !;Befo;t?marks." iettirYgS: [ Help

QBPjUpsbsil

Figure 51: Ettercap output
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The sensor captured all of these attacking packets and we used Commview software to
preprocess these crafted attack packets and it generated a csv file containing these attacks.

SYN Flood and UDP Flood Attacks
We have used Engage Packet builder v2.2.0 to craft SYN Flood and UDP Flood attacks which
has downloaded from www.enfiagesecurity.com. It is Powerful and scriptable Libnet-based
packet builder for Windows platform. It is useful to build personalized packet with the aim of
testing the security of firewall, network, etc. (TCP, IP, UDP, ICMP) and useful to send packets
in wireless 802.11 a/b/g network.

In SYN Flood attack, the attacker sends a lot of TCP packets, where both SYN and
(ACKnowledgment) ACK flags in the header are set to 1 using Engage Packet Builder. The
attacker's IP address is faked and destination IP address is the server victim's address.
Receiving so many packets from attacker prevents victim from accepting new legitimate
requests and may crash the victim server. To craft these attack packets we open the Engage
Packet Builder software and specify the Network Interface card at top left corner and select the
tab for TCP packets at top right corner. Then put some fake IP address (192.168.1.101) at the
place of source IP address and at destination IP address we put the victim's IP address
(192.168.1.102). At source port we put some arbitrary port number (80) and destination port is
some vulnerable port (8080). At the flags tab at the interface we set SYN and ACK. Then we
start the web server by clicking the button at low right corner. Then we specify the number of
packets to be sent at Nb of Packets: 100. Then we press SEND button and it will start sending
the TCP SYN Flood attack packets to the victim's PC. The interface for creating the TCP SYN
Flood attack is shown in figure 52. To create UDP flood packets, we need to go to the UDP tab
besides TCP tab and specify random destination port at each time and send UDP flood packets
to the victim's PC. Interface for creating UDP Flood packets is shown in figure 53.
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Figure 53: Crafting UDP Flood Attack packets

Once these attack packets are sent to the victim's PC we can capture these attack packets from
the PC equipped with sensor and Commview. Then we output these packets in csv format to
further preprocess for training purpose.
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Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
To gather attack packets for Man-In-the-Middle type of attack, we set up a rogue AP with the
same SSID (Service Set Identifier) as the legitimate one in a place nearer than the legitimate
AP. To be successful with this attack we placed the rouge AP at least 5 channels away from the
legitimate AP. Then, using the spoofed client's MAC address we sent de-authentication
packets using Aireplay of BackTrack security tool. As a result, the targeted client is
disconnected from the legitimate AP and is connected to the rogue AP because of the stronger
signal.

In our experiment the legitimate AP was NeuDetect (MAC address: 00-14-D1-3A-71-E4)
operating at channel 3 and the victim's MAC address was 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FC, which was
connected to the legitimate AP. We placed another router with the same SSID (NeuDetect) at
channel 10 and placed it near victim's PC. Initially no PC was connected to the rogue AP.
Then from another PC booted with BackTrack, we launched Aireplay and issued the following
command as shown in figure 54:
aireplay-ng -0 100 -a 00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 -c 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FCathO
Here, -0 means deauthentication, 100 is the number of deauthentication packet to be sent, -a
00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 is the legitimate AP's MAC address, -c 00:0E:35:D7:A7:FC is victim's
MAC address and athO is the network card in use. This step is shown in Figure 54. As a result,
the targeted host disconnect from the legitimate AP. The disconnected victim PC then rescans
wireless channels and connects to the rogue AP.

These de-authentication packets were captured and gathered as anomalous packets with
Commview for NeuDetect software.
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Figure 54: Sending Deauthentication packets to AP

Finally we have combined all of those csv files for different attack packets and also for normal
packets into one csv file as showed in figure 55.
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Figure 55: Preprocessed combined attack and normal packets
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From this combined csv file, we have selected the parameters for feature vector as specified in
the section 3 and uploaded all data of the feature vector into a text file to run through the
Detection module of our proposed system for training process. The training process was done
when we got the root mean square error is equal to 0.0058, which is close to zero, after several
retry of adjusting the values of weights, bias, learning rate as trial and adjustment basis.

4.3.

Test Results

After doing the training with the normal and attack data packets that described in the section
4.3, we have generated similar attack packets following the same steps to test our system
whether it is capable to detect the attacks or not. To do the test we have crafted total about
1400 attack packets which includes 200 for each attacks of WEP Cracking Attacks, Deauthentication Attacks, Disassociation Attacks, ARP Poisoning Attacks, SYN Flood and UDP
Flood Attacks, and also Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Then we run these packets into the
Detection Module of our system and it outputs some packets as alert which have positive
anomaly score and some of them matches with the attacks listed in the attack training database.
Then we calculate the anomaly detection rate and false alarm rate. We tested the same attack
dataset with SNORT Wireless, Wifi-Miner (Apriori association rule based) and WIDCA
(Clustering Technique based) system to compare our system with these three existing system.

Attacks
WEP Cracking
De-authentication
Disassociation
ARP Poisoning
SYN Flood
UDP Flood
Man-in-the-Middle
Total

No. of
Attacks
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
1400

SnortWireless
138
142
139
148
145
144
136
992

Wifi-Miner
174
170
172
175
169
166
167
1193

Table 24: Attacks Detected
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WIDCA
182
185
179
183
175
168
180
1252

NeuDetect
187
195
194
185
190
182
189
1322
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Figure 56: Attacks Detection Comparison

SnortWireless
69%
71%
69.5 %
74%
72.5 %
72%
68%

Attacks
WEP Cracking
De-authentication
Disassociation
ARP Poisoning
SYN Flood
UDP Flood
Man-in-the-Middle

Wifi-Miner
87%
85%
86%
87.5 %
84.5 %
83%
83.5 %

WIDCA
91%
92.5 %
89.5 %
91.5%
87.5 %
84%
90%

NeuDetect
93.5 %
97.5 %
97%
92.5 %
95%
91%
94.5 %

Table 25: Attack-wise Detection Rate

IDS
Snort-Wireless
WIDCA
Will-Miner
NeuDetect

Detection Rate
70.86 %
89.42 %
85.21 %
94.42 %

False Negative %
29.14%
10.57%
14.79 %
05.58 %

Table 26: Detection Rate and False Negative
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In our experiment, we also tested the false positive in our system. We know the false positive
happens when a system flags an alert but in reality it should not be an alert. To perform this
test, we crafted some normal packets (about 5000) to launch into our system and compared the
same to other systems as showed in table 27.

IDS

No. of Normal
Packets
5000
5000
5000
5000

Snort-Wireless
WIDCA
Wifi-Miner
NeuDetect

Packets
Detected
359
127
236
98

False
Positive %
7.18%
2.54 %
4.72 %
1.96%

Table 27: False Positive Rate

8
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Figure 58: False Positive Rate Comparison
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Unknown Attack:
We have crafted an attack which was not used for training of our system to check whether our
system is able to detect it or not. To craft this attack, we sent crafted forged control,
management and data frames to the wireless network using File2air named tool. We used the
following command to send the attack from shell console:

File2air -n 200 -I athO -s 00:14:D1:3A: 71:E4 -d 00:0E:35:D7:A 7:FC -fpath for file

-f: is the location of the file to be replayed into the network, it must be in binary form
-n: is the number of packets to send
IDS
NeuDetect

No. of Unknown
Packets
200

Packets
Detected
178

Table 28: Testing Unknown Attack
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False
Negative %
11.0%

4.4.

Result Analysis:

We see from table 24 that our system, NeuDetect, performed better than SNORT-Wireless,
WIDCA and Wifi-Miner. In table 25 gives an overview of specific attack detection rate. From
there we can see that NeuDetect performed better in detecting De-authentication and
Disassociation attacks than other attacks. In case of the detection rate of UDP Flood attack,
NeuDetect detected less than average detection rate of other of attacks but still in comparison
to SNORT Wireless and WIDCA and Wifi-Miner, it performed better.

In table 26 gives the comparison of an average detection rate and false negative rates where we
can see the attack detection rate of our system is higher as well as the false negative rate is also
reduced than those systems.

In table 27 shows the comparison of the false positive rate. Our system also performed better in
reducing false positive rate. From table 28, we can see that our system has the ability to detect
the unknown attacks which was not taught to detect in the training phase. Everyday we are
experiencing new type of attacks, it is an outstanding feature of our system that it can detect
the unknown new intrusions.

We used hardware sensor in our system to ensure that all packets sent to the access points are
captured and sent to our system for analysis. Snort and most other wireless IDS depends on
packets that passes through the wireless router.
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this thesis, we proposed and implemented a wireless intrusion detection system: NeuDetect,
which uses Neural Network techniques to detect anomalous wireless packets by using training
data. We have used back-propagation algorithm to train the system, then our algorithm was
designed for Anomaly Score calculation which assigns a score to each wireless packet. Positive
anomaly score for specific wireless packet means anomalous pattern while a negative anomaly
score indicates a normal pattern of that wireless packets. We have also used proprietary
Network Chemistry hardware sensors to capture real-time traffic in order to improve intrusion
response time.

We researched and discussed various wireless attacks possible in a wireless network. Based on
our research on well-known wireless intrusions, we demonstrated how these attacks can be
crafted and how it can be captured using our system. We crafted few types of attacks to use as
training data and also for testing our system. In testing phase we have compared our system
with three other wireless intrusion detection systems and found our system is more efficient.
We also used Hardware Sensor to capture wireless packets from specific access points to get
the advantage of real time traffic monitoring to improve intrusion response time. Some other
IDS use net-flow data from routers instead of capturing from airwaves, but in our system we
captures real-time wireless data from airwaves.

In detection of the known intrusion, our system has a better performance with high correctly
detection rate and a low false alarm rate. Specially, our system can detect unknown intrusions
with an acceptable false alarm rate. Everyday we are experiencing new type of attacks, it is an
outstanding feature of our system that it can detect the unknown new intrusions.

There is still room for improvement in our system. Currently in our system, if the anomaly
score does not match with the trained anomaly score database and the corresponding attack
number then the false alarm will be triggered. In future, to reduce the false alarm rate for this
reason we may improve our Decision Module by implementing clustering approach instead of
just comparing with the numeric values i.e. anomaly score. We will work to develop some
adaptive process for weight and learning rate adjustment to reduce training processing time for
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large dataset. We will enhance the ability of the Detection Module of our system to detect the
unknown new intrusions. We will also be working towards making our system generalized so
that it can be used for both wired and wireless intrusion detection. In order to avoid
unreasonable complexity in the neural network, an initial classification of the connection
records to normal and general categories of attacks can be the first step and the records in each
category of intrusions can then be further classified to the attack type, which will also be in our
future enchantment list.
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